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INTRODUCTION

It is possible today, as it never has been before, to speak intelligibly
of international courts.' In recent decades, and particularly since the
1990s, states have created scores of adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative
bodies with power to resolve disputes under international law.2 These
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor, St. John's University School of Law. I thank Curt Bradley,
John Duffy, Jan Klabbers, Julian Ku, John McGinnis, David Sloss, and Paul Stephan for careful
readings of earlier drafts, and the participants in a Hofstra faculty workshop and in the 2006 Annual Workshop of the American Society of International Law's Interest Group on International
Law in Domestic Courts for helpful comments. I joined an amicus brief in Sanchez-Llamas. See
Brief of Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566 and 05-5 1).
1. See, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS

AND TRIBUNALS 3 (2003) (describing the evolution of international courts in recent decades);
Roger P. Alford, The Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunals: InternationalAdjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 160, 160 (2000) (discussing the "explosion
of new international courts and tribunals").
2. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429,
436-38 (2003). For a useful compilation, see The Project on International Courts and Tribunals,
The International Judiciary in Context: A Synoptic Chart (2004), http://www.pict-
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new tribunals differ dramatically from traditional dispute settlement regimes. 3 They are much more institutionalized-much more "courtlike"-than conventional arbitration panels.4 Moreover, while traditional arbitration tended to involve financial or relatively unimportant
territorial claims, the new tribunals increasingly issue rulings on matters
of core domestic authority: criminal law and punishment, environmental
protection, and religious expression. 5 By common consent, the rise of
these new tribunals is one of the most "remarkable" legal developments
of the postwar era.6
A large and growing body of work seeks to make sense of the new
international courts. 7 One question, in particular, has sparked contropcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/Synop- C4.pdf.
3. The history of modem international dispute settlement begins with the Jay Treaty of 1795
between the United States and Great Britain, which established a bilateral commission to arbitrate
claims for the payment of pre-revolutionary debts. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the
United States as Quasi-InternationalTribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive
Jurisdictionover Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765,
1868-69 (describing arbitration provisions of Jay Treaty). Another early example is the commission established to arbitrate claims arising from the capture of British merchant ships by American naval vessels during the Civil War. See A. Mark Weisburd, InternationalCourts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 897-98 (2000). The Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA)-really a roster of arbitrators available for settling interstate disputes-also played a brief
but significant role in the early twentieth century. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams,
Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1229, 1290-91 (2004); see also Philippe J. Sands, The Future of International
Adjudication, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1999). For the PCA's current role in selecting ICJ
judges, see infra text accompanying notes 221-24.
4. Martinez, supra note 2, at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, InstitutionalSettlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54
DUKE L.J. 1143, 1151-52 (2005) (explaining that modem international law, which international
courts apply, "replicates many central concerns of the domestic regulatory state"). On the routine
nature of traditional state to state arbitration, see Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1328
("The majority of international disputes which have in the past been settled by arbitration or by
some other legal procedure have been either pecuniary claims or disputes about national frontiers
in remote and sparsely inhabited regions.") (citation omitted).
6. See, e.g., SHANY, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the "remarkable transformation" of international dispute settlement in recent decades).
7. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103, 144-51 (2005);
Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: InternationalReview of National Courts, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, InternationalTribunals, and the
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 (2003); Alford, supra note 1; Jose E. Alvarez,
The New Dispute Settlers: (Hal) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J 405 (2003); Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of
Process, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
Dualist Constitution,and the InternationalistConception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Dualist Constitution];Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, Inter-
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versy. What effect should rulings of international courts--one might
call them "international judgments"--have in domestic courts? In the
United States, debate has centered on a series of rulings by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the application of the Vienna Conven-

tion on Consular Relations (VCCR).8 The VCCR, a multilateral treaty
that the United States ratified in 1969, grants foreign nationals the right
to seek the assistance of their consulates in the event that local authorities arrest them. 9 An Optional Protocol to the VCCR gives the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the
treaty.' ° Since the late 1990s, the ICJ repeatedly has ruled that the
United States has violated the VCCR.1" In its 2004 Avena judgment, the
ICJ ruled that, where American courts had convicted foreign nationals
and sentenced them to "severe penalties," the United States must rem-

edy its violations by providing judicial review and reconsideration
of
2

the convictions, notwithstanding procedural bars under local law.'
The United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol after Avena,

thereby eliminating the possibility of future adverse judgments in
national Delegations];William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Laura A. Dickinson,
Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S.CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002); Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3;
Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: InternationalRelations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832
(2002); Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) [hereinafter Helfer & Slaughter, Supranational
Adjudication]; Julian G. Ku, InternationalDelegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006); Martinez, supra note 2; Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance?
The United States and InternationalAdjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783 (2004); Melissa A.
Waters, MediatingNorms and Identity: The Role of TransnationalJudicialDialogue in Creating
and Enforcing InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005); Weisburd, supra note 3; Young, supra note 5. For a recent debate, see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence]; Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create InternationalTribunals:
A Response to ProfessorsPosner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C.
Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REV. 957 (2005).
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter VCCR]. Scholars have given the VCCR litigation a great deal of attention. See, e.g.,
Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755 (2006).
9. VCCR, supra note 8, art. 36. On American ratification, see Ku, supra note 7, at 9.
10. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
11. See Ku, supra note 7, at 9-16.
12. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 69-70 (Mar. 31).
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VCCR cases.' 3 It remains party to scores of other agreements granting
the ICJ jurisdiction to resolve disputes, however, and the domestic force
of ICJ rulings, and international judgments generally, remains a vital
question. 14 Last year, in the much anticipated Sanchez-Llamas v. Ore15
gon, a divided Court issued its most definitive ruling yet on subject.
Sanchez-Llamas concerned the weight that domestic judges should give
to Avena and other judgments that the ICJ had issued before the United
States' withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. More specifically, the
case concerned the effect that the
ICJ's interpretations of the VCCR
16
should have in American courts.
Both Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, and Justice Breyer,
writing for the minority, agreed that the ICJ's judgments merited "'respectful consideration."",17 They disagreed, though, on what "respectful
consideration" required. The Chief Justice maintained that, while the
Court should pay attention to the ICJ's views, it had a responsibility to
reach its own conclusions about the VCCR. Notwithstanding the ICJ's
interpretation, the treaty did not preclude application of local procedural-bar rules.' 8 Justice Breyer, by contrast, argued that "respectful
consideration" required greater deference to the ICJ. Even assuming its
judgments did not bind American courts, the ICJ had interpreted the
VCCR reasonably. Given its comparative expertise in international law
and the desirability of uniform interpretation, the Court should have
adopted its reading of the treaty. 19
It is tempting to dismiss this debate on the precise definition of "respectful consideration" as minor. But the split in Sanchez-Llamas reflects a more profound disagreement on the proper way to integrate in13. See Ku, supra note 7, at 34-35.
14. See id. at 35 (noting that the United States "remains party to at least seventy treaties"
granting the ICJ authority to resolve disputes). As this Article was going to print, the Supreme
Coart granted certiorari in another VCCR case. See ex parte Medellin, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert. granted sub. nom. Medellin v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2007)
(No. 06-984).
15. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). The case sparked an unusually large
number of amicus briefs from academics on both sides of the controversy. See infra text accompanying notes 118-21.
16. The case did not involve the enforcement of any ICJ orders themselves. See John Harrison, InternationalAdjudicators and Judicial Independence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127,
128 (2006). For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
17. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
(1998)); Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For more on Breard, see
infra text accompanying notes 68-80.
18. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2683-87.
19. Id. at 2699-2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ternational and domestic judiciaries. To understand the case-to appreciate what it portends for the treatment of international judgments more
generally-one has to grasp the deeper arguments that lie beneath the
surface. 20 Each of the two main opinions reflects one side of a larger
debate that has raged for the last decade. The Court's opinion reflects
what might be called a dualist approach: in the absence of a domestic
act of incorporation, international judgments have only "information,"
not "disposition," value for domestic courts.2' International judgments
can supply good arguments and helpful analysis for domestic courts to
use in their own treatment of legal problems, but they cannot influence a
case, the way domestic precedent can, by virtue of their status as judicial pronouncements. 22 By contrast, the dissent adopts the comity model
that has gained considerable academic currency in recent years. That
model calls for an informal, cooperative relationship between international and national judiciaries-a "dialogue" or "community of
courts. 2 3 On this view, international judgments lack binding authority,
but domestic courts should defer to them, where possible, in the interests of justice and global uniformity.
This Article will show why the dualist approach affords the superior
means of accommodating the sort of international judgment at issue in
Sanchez-Llamas. Scholars sometimes dismiss dualism as blunt and pa20. Sanchez-Llamas, and the VCCR litigation more generally, also has implications for the
proper role of the Court in the American constitutional system, particularly with regard to the reception of international law. I leave those constitutional questions for others. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, The FederalJudicialPower and the InternationalLegal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59;
Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 309, 326 (2006).
21. Cf John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 310 (2006)
(distinguishing between "informational" and "dispositional value" of legal authority).
22. See id.
23. SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 68 (describing the system as a "community of courts"); Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2034 (proposing "a model of 'dialectical review'-a pattern ofjudicial review, yet one with dialogue at its core"). Other pieces that incorporate comity ideas in their treatment of international judgments include Alford, supra note 7, at 715-31 (discussing the "foreign
judgment model" and its applicability to certain international judgments); Burke-White, supra
note 7, at 3 (arguing that "the emerging system of international criminal justice can be conceived
as a community of courts" that comprises national and supranational tribunals); Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 282 (describing "the concept of a global community of law, constituted... by overlapping networks of national, regional, and global tribunals");
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 45, 48 (2002); Martinez, supra note 2, at 434 (arguing for the application of"antiparochial, prodialogic canon[s] when deciding procedural issues in transnational cases"); AnneMarie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708 (1998); Waters, supra note 7, at 489-90
(endorsing a "transnational judicial dialogue" among courts worldwide).
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rochial.2 4 In this context, though, dualism promotes a workable balance
between the advantages and disadvantages of international courts. International courts offer both a promise and a threat: a promise of more uniform, predictable, and-to the extent international judges have comparative expertise-better reasoned international law, and a threat of
decisions imposed by relatively unaccountable, unfamiliar, and inflexible actors. The dualist approach maximizes the promise while minimizing the threat. By granting international judgments information
value, it allows domestic courts to weigh the benefits of uniformity,
predictability, and expertise and, when appropriate, to adopt the reasoning of international courts. At the same time, by denying international
judgments disposition value, it prevents relatively illegitimate actors
from issuing rulings that bind domestic populations in circumstances,
like the VCCR cases, that implicate sensitive local issues.2 6 The dualist
approach thus minimizes the occasion for nationalist backlashes that can
only lessen the beneficial influence of international courts.
The comity model also advances the promise of international
courts.27 Unlike the dualist approach, though, it does not mitigate the
threat of illegitimate action. Although its advocates speak in terms of
judicial dialogue, the model's logic leads inevitably to a regime in
which international judgments have more than information value for
domestic courts. (This should come as no surprise; if international judgments had only information value, the comity model would add nothing
to dualism.) In fact, the model contemplates a strong presumption in favor of deferring to international courts. As a practical matter, domestic
courts would routinely adopt the reasoning of international tribunals,

24. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?, 91
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 504, 517 (1997) (arguing that dualism is based on an "anachronistic.. .isolationism and unilateralism"). See generally Bradley, Dualist Constitution, supra note 7,
at 531 (discussing rejection of dualist thought "in the American international law academy").
25. Cf Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to InternationalOrganizations:New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 77 (2000) (discussing legitimacy concerns
raised by the delegation of domestic authority to international organizations).
26. See Curtis Bradley & Lori Fisler Damrosch, Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 683 (2005) (comments of Prof. Bradley) (discussing constitutional concerns that would exist if ICJ rulings were given direct effect in VCCR
cases).
27. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 37, 62 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory
H. Fox eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS] (arguing that "regular and interactive transjudicial communication" between national and supranational courts would enhance
"the quality ofjudicial decision-making.. worldwide").
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and international judgments would have something very close to disposition value for domestic courts.
The strength of the pro-deference presumption appears in two examples that advocates give to illustrate the model: European regional

courts and the American regime for enforcing foreign judgments.28 The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) lack formally hierarchical relationships with European
national courts. 29 Nonetheless, European national courts accept the au-

thority of both tribunals, deferring to their interpretations as a matter of
course. 30 Similarly, notwithstanding the absence of a formal obligation,
American courts "almost always enforce" the judgments of foreign

courts, on a comity theory, without raising serious legitimacy concerns. 3 1 If these two examples serve as any guide-and supporters
clearly believe they do-the comity model contemplates a systematic
deference by domestic courts to international tribunals.
Because the model would in practice be so close to a disposition
value regime, it could not overcome the legitimacy threat that interna-

tional courts pose. Moreover, the European and foreign judgments examples do not translate well outside their own contexts. In Europe, the
receptiveness of domestic courts to ECJ and ECtHR judgments is a
function of a larger drive toward regional integration, which is itself a
function of a shared European culture and history. 32 No similar com28. For discussions of the European experience, see SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 80-85; Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2153-61; John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of
Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS, supra note 27, at
373, 379-82; Mark Gibney, On the Need for an International Civil Court, 26 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 47, 55 (2002); Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at
290-98; Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court of the European Union in National Courts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 221; Martinez, supra note 2, at 445-47, 498.
For discussions of the foreign judgments example, see Alford, supra note 7, at 715-31; Koh, supro note 23, at 46, 48; Martinez, supra note 2, at 499; Slaughter, supra note 23, at 708.
29. See Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2157 (contrasting the relationship between the ECJ and
European national courts with the hierarchy that exists between the United States Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeals); John Cary Sims, Compliance Without Remands: The Experience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 645 (2004) ("The
[ECtHR] is not empowered to give any direction at all to the national courts.").
30. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
353-55 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the ECJ); Georg Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal Order, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 359,
378 (2005) (discussing the ECtHR).
31. Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American " Foreign Judgments be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L.
REv. 783,791 (2004).
32. See J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that the ECtHR "can appeal to a common
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mitment to political integration exists at the global level, and there is
much less perception of shared values, particularly with respect to the
sort of divisive local questions that international courts increasingly address.33
Similarly, while American courts regularly enforce foreign judgments, those judgments tend to arise in the context of private commercial disputes where comity arguments work well. 34 In other contexts,
foreign judgments receive less favorable treatment. For example,
American courts typically avoid enforcing foreign public law judgments
and judgments that violate fundamental constitutional principles.3 5
Moreover, the foreign judgments regime relies, at least in part, on reciprocity arguments that are out of place in the context of international
judgments.36 Finally, enforcing a foreign judgment is a much smaller
intrusion on a domestic legal system than the broader sort of deference
that the comity model envisions. 37 The foreign judgments example does
not suggest that domestic courts would feel comfortable deferring in a
systematic way to the reasoning of international judgments. 38
Despite its seemingly obscure preoccupation with the definition of
"respectful consideration," then, Sanchez-Llamas is an important case.
It suggests that the American response to the growing prominence of international courts will be a moderate and sensible one. In rejecting the
comity analysis favored by academics and urged by the dissent, the
Court avoided a model that would raise serious legitimacy concerns and
create unnecessary friction between domestic and international institutions. In endorsing a dualist approach, the Court preserved a space for
local control and ensured that international courts will continue to fill,
but not exceed, their proper and important role: providing persuasive
analysis that domestic judges can use to promote uniformity, predictability, and justice on a global scale.
set of cultural values"); Alvarez, supra note 7, at 430 (discussing the importance of regional "integrative goals" to the success of the ECtHR and the ECJ).
33. See Alvarez, supra note 7, at 430.
34. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 161
(2002) (noting that courts "routinely enforce" foreign judgments respecting private law).
35. See id.; see also Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, The First
Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697,
699-701 (2003).
36. See Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of JurisdictionalRules and Recognition Practiceon
International Business Transactions: The US. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327, 353 (2004)
(discussing different views on the reciprocity requirement).
37. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 361-62.
38. See Bradley & Damrosch, supra note 26, at 683-84 (comments of Prof. Bradley).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes Sanchez-Llamas,
situating the case in the context of the wider VCCR controversy of
which it is a part. Part II explores the deeper arguments that lie below
the surface in the case. Part II(A) shows how the Court's opinion reflects a dualist approach and discusses the legitimacy arguments that
support that approach. It shows how dualism allows domestic judges to
balance the competing demands of international order and domestic authority. Part II(B) explores the comity model that the dissent endorses
and explains why the Court was right to reject it. Part III concludes.
I.

SANCHEZ-LLAMAS AND THE

VCCR LITIGATION

Sanchez-Llamas is the most recent in a complex series of cases, dating back about a decade, in which American courts have considered the
effect of ICJ judgments in disputes under the VCCR. To understand
Sanchez-Llamas, one needs some background on the ICJ and on that series of cases. I offer that background here, before moving on to a description of Sanchez-Llamas itself.
A.

The ICJ: An Introduction

One of the oldest international courts, the ICJ is "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." 39 It comprises a bench of fifteen
judges elected, for renewable nine year terms, in a complex process involving the General Assembly and the Security Council.4 ° The judes
are "independent" 4 1 and "represent[]... the main forms of civilization
and... the principal legal systems of the world., 42 All UN members-191, at present count-are parties to the Court's charter, known as ihe
Statute.43
Only states may appear as parties before the Court. 44 States can submit disputes either on an ad hoc basis or under a categorical consent to
39. U.N. Charter art. 92. The Court was established in 1945 as "the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice," which was itself established in 1920 by the League of Nations. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (4th ed. 2003).

40. Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 3, 4, 13, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
41. International
Court
of Justice,
Members
of the
Court, http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p I= I&p2=2 (last visited May 1, 2007).
42. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 9.
43. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. I ("All Members of the United Nations are ipsofacto parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.").
44. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 34, para. 1.
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the Court's general jurisdiction.45 Of these two alternatives, the former
has been a much more significant source of the Court's jurisdiction.46
States that wish to refer particular disputes to the ICJ typically do so,

under Article 36(1) of the Statute, by way of a clause granting the Court
jurisdiction in the context of a specific treaty.4 7 Hundreds of bilateral

and multilateral treaties grant the Court authority to resolve disputes
about their construction and application, including agreements relating
to criminal punishment, the environment, race and sex discrimination,
and certain security matters. 48 The United States is a party to at least 70
such treaties, including, until very recently, the VCCR. 49 Collectively,
these treaties commit the United States to accept ICJ jurisdiction over
disputes with "virtually every nation in the world., 50 While some of the
treaties deal with innocuous subjects like road conditions, others relate
to high profile political concerns like narcotics trafficking and terror-

ism.,,
The Court decides disputes by applying the standard sources of inter-

national law: treaties, custom, "the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," and, as "subsidiary" means, "judicial decisions

and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations. 52 Judgments are not subject to appeal, but they bind only the
45. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 36. In addition to its contentious jurisdiction, the Court has
authority to render advisory legal opinions to certain international organizations. See U.N. Charter
art. 96.
46. See Fred L. Morrison, Treaties as a Source ofJurisdiction,Especially in U.S. Practice, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58, 58 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.

1987). Only sixty-five states presently accept the Court's compulsory general jurisdiction, most
of them with important reservations. See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing
the
Jurisdiction
of
the
Court
as
Compulsory,
http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=l&p3=3 (providing a compilation of declarations) (last
visited May 1, 2007); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 979 (5th ed. 2003) (stating that
the "majority" of declarations are "conditional"); id. at 981 (explaining that reservations "are usually an attempt to prevent the Court becoming involved in a dispute which is felt to concern vital
interests"). Only one permanent Security Council member, Great Britain, presently consents to
compulsory general jurisdiction. Posner & Yoo, JudicialIndependence, supra note 7, at 38.
47. See ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 36, para. 1 ("The jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for...in treaties or conventions in force.").
48. Morrison, supra note 46, at 61. For a list, see International Court of Justice, Treaties,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p l=5&p2= 1&p3=4 (last visited May 1, 2007).
49. Ku, supra note 7, at 35.
50. Morrison, supra note 46, at 68.
51. Id. at 66.
52. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 38, para. 1. Some of these sources, particularly custom, allow the judges a great deal of discretion, a matter that has concerned some commentators. See
John 0. McGinnis, The AppropriateHierarchyof GlobalMultilateralismand Customary Interna-
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parties and only with regard to the particular case.5 3 The UN Charter
provides that states must comply with judgments in any case in which
they are parties, but does not prescribe the effect of judgments in domestic courts.5 4 If a losing party fails to comply, the prevailing party
may apply to the Security Council for assistance; the Council "may, if it
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to
be taken to give effect to the judgment., 55 Despite this grant of authority, "requests for enforcement are rare and the Security Council has
never acted to enforce an ICJ decision. 5 6
There are signs that its caseload is growing, but the ICJ has not been
an active tribunal. 57 Moreover, while hard data is elusive, states' compliance with the Court's judgments seems somewhat spotty. 58 One recent study puts the overall compliance rate at 68 percent; the rate in ad
hoc disputes is apparently higher.59 As an empirical matter, compliance
is most likely in cases where neither party objects to ICJ resolution.60
Not surprisingly, these turn out to be low stakes disputes that the parties
do not view as particularly important. 6 1 States tend to reject ICJ jurisdiction over disputes that implicate significant interests. 62 Ironically, the
tional Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 243 (2003) (discussing the "problem of unrepresentativeness" in ICJ judges' "power to create customary international law").
53. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case."), art. 60 ("The judgment is final and
without appeal.").
54. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. I ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.").
55. Id. at para. 2.
56. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1308.
57. As of 2004, there had been a total of 129 cases filed with the Court since its establishment, a number that works out to about two cases per year. See id. at 1309. On the recent growth
of the Court's docket, see Alford, supra note 1,at 160.
58. See SHAW, supra note 46, at 996 (noting that "the record of compliance with judgments is
only marginally satisfactory"); Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1310 (discussing "difficulty of establishing compliance as an empirical matter").
59. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1310-11; see Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence, supra note 7, at 38 (discussing the Ginsburg & McAdams study). Another recent study of
cases from 1987 to 2004 finds a "full compliance" rate of 60 percent. Colter Paulson, Compliance
with FinalJudgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 434,
460 (2004).
60. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1313; see also MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that an ICJ decision seems
"most often respected when all states concerned have voluntarily come to the Court"). Indeed, the
ICJ sometimes avoids issuing merits judgments incases involving recalcitrant parties. Id. at 134.
61. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1328; see also JANIS, supra note 60, at 12930 (discussing ad hoc jurisdiction).
62. See SHAW, supra note 46, at 981 (discussing general jurisdiction).
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most celebrated examples of resistance involve liberal democratic
states-the sort of regimes
that might seem most likely to comply with
63
obligations.
international
B.

The VCCR Litigation

The VCCR is a multilateral agreement that relates generally to consular relations and functions. Article 36 affords three rights to a foreign
national in the event that local law enforcement officers arrest him. 64 At
the foreign national's request, local authorities must notify his consulate
of his arrest "without delay." Local authorities must also forward "without delay" any communication the foreign national wishes to make to
his consulate. Finally, local authorities must inform the foreign national
of these rights, once again "without delay." The foreign national must
exercise his rights "in conformity with" the host country's "laws and
regulations," but those laws and regulations "must enable full effect to
be given to the purposes for which the rights... are intended." 65 An Optional Protocol grants the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over any disputes
arising out of the interpretation and application of the treaty.6 6 The
United States ratified the VCCR, and became a party to the Optional
Protocol, in 1969.67
The VCCR litigation, a series of cases that has preoccupied the international law academy for the better part of a decade, began in 1998,
when Paraguay brought an action in the ICJ alleging that the United
States had violated the treaty by failing to inform a Paraguayan national,
Angel Breard, of his rights under Article 36.68 Virginia had convicted
Breard of capital murder and sentenced him to death.69 At the time of
his arrest and trial, Virginia authorities had not informed Breard of his
rights to seek consular assistance; Breard apparently learned of these
rights after his appeal and state habeas action already had run.70 Shortly
before his scheduled execution date, Paraguay brought its action in the
63. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 3, at 1311, 1314. If anything, Ginsburg and
McAdams write, the evidence supports a negative correlation between democracy and compliance. Id. at 1314.
64. VCCR, supra note 8, art. 36(1)(b). The rights apply to a foreign national "arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or... detained in any other manner." Id.
65. VCCR, supra note 8, art. 36(2).
66. Optional Protocol, supra note 10, art. I.
67. Ku, supra note 7, at 9, 10.
68. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Apr. 9).
69. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
70. Id.
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ICJ, and the ICJ issued a provisional order directing the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal to ensure" that Breard's execution be
stayed pending the ICJ's final decision on Paraguay's claims.71
In a per curiam opinion issued on the date set for execution, the
United States Supreme Court denied Breard's request for a stay.7 2 The
Court reasoned that Breard's VCCR claims were procedurally barred
under federal law; by failing to raise them in the Virginia courts, Breard
had forfeited his right to raise them in later federal proceedings.7 3 It was
"unfortunate," the Court wrote, that the ICJ lacked time to decide the
dispute between Paraguay and the United States, but its decision would
not bind American courts anyway. 74 "[W]hile we should give respectful
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by
an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such," the Court
wrote, the application of the VCCR in the United States was a matter for
American judges to decide.75 The Court noted that the State Department
had asked Virginia's governor to stay Breard's execution in light of the
ICJ order and added that, if the governor wished to postpone the execution, "that is his prerogative. 7 6
Governor Jim Gilmore decided not to wait. While he understood the
difficulties that ignoring the ICJ's order could create for Americans
abroad, his "first duty" was to provide for the safety of Americans and
foreign nationals residing in Virginia. 77 That responsibility could not be
"transferr[ed]" to the ICJ, which had "no authority to interfere with our
criminal justice system., 78 Breard's guilt was unquestioned, and the
American courts that had heard his VCCR claims had denied them.7 9
The execution went ahead as scheduled, and Paraguay
and the United
80
States eventually reached a diplomatic settlement.

71. Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 1998 I.C.J. at 258.
72. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378-79. Paraguay also had sought to intervene. Id. at 374.
73. Id. at 375-76. The Court also ruled that a federal statute enacted after the VCCR, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, precluded an evidentiary hearing in Breard's
case, thus making presentation of his VCCR claims impossible. See id. at 376-77.
74. Id. at 378.
75. Id. at 375.
76. Id. at 378.
77. Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14,
1998), quoted in Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
666, 674 (1998).
78. Charney & Reisman, supra note 77, at 674.
79. See id. at 674-75.
80. Ku, supra note 7, at 12.
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American violations of the VCCR came up again in LaGrand,an action Germany brought at the ICJ in 1999. 8 Arizona authorities had arrested, tried, and convicted two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand, of capital murder without informing them of their rights under
Article 36.82 The LaGrands learned of their rights only after their appeals and state habeas actions had run; when they tried to raise their
VCCR claims in a subsequent federal habeas action, the federal courts
ruled that the claims were procedurally barred.83 Shortly before the date
scheduled for Walter LaGrand's execution, the ICJ issued a provisional
order for a stay to allow it to hear Germany's claim; 84 once again, the
Supreme Court declined to enforce the ICJ's order.85 Citing her duty to
uphold state law, Arizona's governor refused to grant a reprieve, and
Walter LaGrand's execution went ahead as scheduled.86
Unlike Paraguay, Germany continued to press its claim at the ICJ,
and in 2001 the ICJ issued a merits judgment. 87 The ICJ rejected the
idea that domestic procedural default rules could prevent the assertion
of VCCR claims in American courts.8 8 Article 36 conferred individually
enforceable rights that American authorities had ignored; 89 under the
circumstances, application of the procedural default rule denied those
rights "'full effect."' 90 Moreover, the United States had an obligation to
remedy violations that had injured German nationals. "[W]here the individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties," the ICJ wrote, the United
States must "allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the

81. See William J. Aceves, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 210, 210
(2002).
82. Id.
83. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 476-77 (June 27).
84. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1999
I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3).
85. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (per curiam).
86. See Mani Sheik, Comment, From Breard to Medellin: Supreme Court Inaction or ICJActivism in the Field of InternationalLaw?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 531, 544-45 (2006). Karl LaGrand had
been executed before Germany commenced its action at the ICJ. Aceves, supra note 81, at 210.
87. LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. at 466.
88. See id. at 495-98.
89. Id. at 494.
90. Id. at 498 (quoting VCCR art. 36, para. 2). The ICJ stressed that the procedural default
rule itself was not problematic, only its application in the circumstances. Id. at 497, 513.
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[VCCR]."' The ICJ left the method for carrying out this obligation to
the United States.92
Three years later, the ICJ reaffirmed LaGrand in Avena, an action
that Mexico brought on behalf of its nationals on death row in the
United States. 93 The ICJ reaffirmed its earlier holding on the procedural
default rule, noting that the United States had not revised the rule since
LaGrandnor attempted to prevent its application in situations where local authorities' violations of the VCCR themselves had precluded foreign nationals from raising their claims in a timely fashion.94 Moreover,
the ICJ clarified that the "review and reconsideration" it had called for
in LaGrand referred to judicial proceedings, not executive clemency
hearings, as the United States had maintained. 95 Finally, the ICJ indicated that its reasoning did not relate solely to Mexicans, but extended
generally to all foreign nationals subject to "severe penalties" in the
United States.96
The action now shifted back to the United States. Shortly after Mexico had brought its action in Avena, the ICJ had issued a provisional order directing the United States to prevent the execution of Mexican nationals whose VCCR rights had been violated.9 7 One of the Mexicans,
Osbaldo Torres, on death row in Oklahoma, petitioned the Supreme
Court for a stay of execution on the basis of the ICJ's order; as it had in
Breard and LaGrand,the Court denied the petition.9 8 Before the date set
for Torres's execution, though, the ICJ handed down its final judgment
in Avena, and Oklahoma's governor decided-surprisingly, given the
earlier responses by Virginia and Arizona-to commute Torres's sentence to life without parole. 99 Governor Brad Henry explained that there
91. Id. at 513-14.
92. Id. The ICJ also ruled that the United States had violated Germany's rights under the
VCCR, id. at 491-92, and that its earlier provisional order had been legally binding on the United
States, id. at 506.

93. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). More than
fifty Mexican nationals, in ten different states, were involved. See Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Position
Before InternationalCourt of Justice in Mexican Death Penalty Case, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 434,
434-35 (2003).
94. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 56-57.
95. Id. at 63-66.
96. Id. at 69-70. The court also ruled on other issues, including the burden of proof as to the
dual nationality of the detainees, id. at 41-42; the timing of notification, id. at 43, 49; and the necessity for suppression of any evidence obtained prior to notification, id. at 61. As to this last
point, the court declined to order suppression. Id.
97. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 309, 319 (Feb. 5, 2003).
98. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
99. Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death
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were extenuating circumstances in Torres's case, but the urgings of the
State Department and the Avena judgment itself were the decisive factors.' 0 0 Indeed, Governor Henry noted the ICJ's ruling that Torres's
VCCR rights had been violated; as a result of American treaty commitments, he stated, "the ruling of the ICJ [was] binding on U.S. courts."' 0 1

Meanwhile, another Mexican on death row in Texas, Jose Medellin,
was also seeking to rely on Avena. When lower federal courts dismissed

as procedurally barred a habeas action he had brought to challenge his
conviction, Medellin sought review in the Supreme Court, arguing that
Avena precluded application of procedural default rules to his VCCR
claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the stage seemed set

for a definitive ruling on the effect of ICJ judgments.' 0 2 In the end, a decision never came. A month before the date set for argument, President
Bush issued a short memorandum stating that the United States would
comply with Avena "by having State courts give effect to the decision,"

with respect to the Mexican nationals the case covered, "in accordance
with general principles of comity."' 10 3 In response, Medellin brought a
new state habeas action.' 0 4 In light of these developments, which potenRow
Inmate
Torres,
(May
13,
2004)
http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display article.phparticleid=30 1& article-type=1 [hereinafter
Henry Press Release]. Earlier that day, a state court had granted Torres a stay of execution and a
hearing on his VCCR claims. Id.; see Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals: Osbaldo Torres v.
The State of Oklahoma (May 13, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1227 (2004). The court did not issue an opinion explaining its reasons. One judge wrote a special concurrence arguing that Oklahoma courts
must give "full faith and credit" to the Avena decision. Id. at 1229 (Chapel, J., concurring). Two
judges dissented, arguing that Avena was not binding on Oklahoma courts. Id. at 1234 (Lumpkin,
J., dissenting).
100. See Henry Press Release, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005). The Court's action sparked a flurry of
activity in the international law academy. Leading scholars filed amicus briefs on both sides in
Medellin, urging enforcement or non-enforcement of ICJ orders on a variety of theories. See, e.g,
Brief of International Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 176453; Brief for Professors of International Law,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No.04-5928), 2005 WL 497763.
103. Memorandum for the Attorney General, in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 app. 2 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL
504490 [hereinafter Bush Memorandum]; see also Medellin, 544 U.S. at 663 (discussing Bush
memorandum). The Bush memorandum raises significant constitutional questions that I do not
address here. For a good discussion, see Bradley, supra note 20.
104. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 663-64. In November 2006, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed this action, holding that Avena did not bind American courts and that the Bush memorandum was unconstitutional. Ex parte Medellin, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert.
granted sub. nom. Medellin v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2007) (No. 06-984). The
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Court dismissed
tially mooted the central issues in the case, a 0 divided
5
granted.1
improvidently
as
certiorari
the writ of
The Bush memorandum proved to be the first of a two-part strategy.
About a week later, the Administration announced that the United States
was withdrawing from the Optional Protocol, thus ending ICJ jurisdiction over VCCR claims against it.10 6 A State Department spokesman
explained that the United States had not anticipated, when it joined the
Optional Protocol, that the ICJ would use its jurisdiction to intervene in
domestic criminal proceedings. 0 7 "We have a system of justice that
provides people with due process and review of their cases," the
spokesman argued, "[a]nd it's not appropriate that there be some international court that comes in and can reverse decisions of our national
08

courts."1

C.

Sanchez-Llamas: A Summary

This, then, was the situation seven years after the VCCR litigation
had begun with Breard: a series of high profile cases, involving four
states, the Supreme Court, and the Executive Branch, had failed to settle
the status of ICJ judgments in American courts. While the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Optional Protocol precluded the possibility of further adverse judgments in VCCR cases, it did not resolve
the domestic effect of decisions, like LaGrandand Avena, that the ICJ
already had announced. Moreover, the United States remained party to
scores of other treaties that granted the ICJ jurisdiction over their interpretation and application. 0 9 The effect of ICJ judgments thus remained
an open, and important, question.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon provided a definitive answer." 0 SanchezLlamas was a consolidated case addressing the VCCR claims of two
Supreme Court will hear this case next term.
105. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 666-67. Four justices-Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyerdissented from the dismissal.
106. See Letter from Condoleeza Rice to Kofi Annan (Mar. 7, 2005), quoted in Frederic L.
Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican
2005),
(Mar.
Rights
Convention
Consular
and
Nationals
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insightsO50309a.html.
107. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Dep't of State, Mar. 10, 2005 (comments of Adam Ereli,
Deputy Spokesman), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm [hereinafter Daily Press
Briefing].
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
110. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).

82

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 48:1

foreign nationals whom American courts had convicted of murder. Both
argued that the VCCR conferred individually enforceable rights that
American authorities had violated."' In support, they cited the ICJ's
rulings in LaGrand and Avena-rulings that merited "respectful consideration" under Breard.1 2 One of the petitioners argued further that LaGrand and Avena required the Court to reconsider Breard's holding that
procedural default rules applied to VCCR claims."' 3 Since Breard, he
noted, the ICJ twice had determined that procedural default rules could
not bar VCCR claims. The Court "should
not diverge from the ICJ's
14
construction without ample reason."'
Sanchez-Llamas did not involve the enforcement of ICJ judgments as
such." l5 Unlike their counterparts in Breard, LaGrand, Torres, and
Medellin, the petitioners in Sanchez-Llamas did not rely on stay orders
the ICJ had issued with respect to them. 1 6 Their claim was a broader
one: not that American courts should give effect to particular ICJ judgments, but that American courts should defer more generally to the reasoning of the ICJ. They argued, in other words, that American courts
should adhere to the ICJ's interpretations of the VCCR even in cases involving different claimants. It was this broader assertion, and not the
comparatively narrow question of enforcing
individual ICJ judgments,
1
that was at issue in Sanchez-Llamas. 17

111. Id. at 2677.
112. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). For petitioners' arguments on this point, see
Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 26-28, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter Sanchez-Llamas Brief]; Brief for Petitioner Mario A.
Bustillo at 30-31, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 05-5 1).
113. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682-83. The other petitioner argued that the trial court
should have suppressed his statements to the police because local authorities had not informed
him of his VCCR rights. Id. at 2678. Because the ICJ judgments did not require suppression, see
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 61 (Mar. 31), the Court did
not need to address the effect of ICJ rulings in addressing (and rejecting) this claim. See SanchezLlamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2678-82.
114. Reply Brief for Petitioner Mario A. Bustillo at 11, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct.
2669 (2006) (No. 05-5 1).
115. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 94; cf Young, supra note 5, at 1231 (distinguishing between binding ICJ judgments and ICJ interpretations).
116. One of the petitioners, Mario Bustillo, was a Honduran, and thus not covered by any of
the earlier ICJ orders. The other, Moises Sanchez-Llamas, was a Mexican, but was not among the
51 Mexicans expressly covered by the Avena order. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 93. His lawyers asserted in passing that the Avena judgment should apply to him, but they focused their argument on the "respectful consideration" point. See Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 112, at 9,
27. That is the point that the Court's opinion ultimately addressed.
117. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 94; Harrison, supra note 16, at 128.
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Like Medellin before it, Sanchez-Llamas drew enormous attention
from the international law academy." 8 Several leading scholars filed
amicus briefs in the case. One such brief, filed by nine noted ICJ experts
in support of petitioners, maintained that LaGrand and Avena an-9
nounced binding rules of decision that American courts must follow."
Another brief in support of petitioners, filed for several former highranking American diplomats by Dean Harold Koh, maintained that
American courts should defer to the ICJ judgments, in the same way
they generally deferred to foreign judgments, in the interests of "comity
and uniform treaty interpretation.' 20 Finally, some scholars filed an
amicus brief in support of respondents, arguing that comity concepts
21
were out of place in relation to international tribunals like the ICJ.'
Writing for a five person majority, Chief Justice Roberts ruled
against the petitioners. 22 Even assuming that the VCCR conferred individually enforceable rights-a matter he did not decide-petitioners
were not entitled to relief.' 23 LaGrand and Avena did not require the
Court to reconsider its earlier holding with respect to procedural default
rules. 124 While the ICJ judgments merited "respectful consideration"
under Breard, 25 they were not "conclusive on our courts."' 126 The Constitution gave federal courts the ultimate authority to determine the
meaning of treaties; the United States had ratified the Optional Protocol
on the basis of that understanding. 27 Moreover, "[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended
to" bind domestic courts. 128 ICJ interpretations did not bind the ICJ itself in subsequent cases.' 29 Indeed, while the UN Charter required states
118. See supra note 102 (discussing academics' briefs in Medellin).
119. Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 1, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (Nos. 04-10566 and 05-5 1).
120. Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Mario A.
Bustillo and Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 6, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006)
(Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566). The brief also suggested that ICJ opinions were binding on the Court
as a matter of international law, but did not pursue that argument. See id.
121. Brief of Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations
Law of the U.S. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566 and 05-51).
122. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the Court's opinion.
123. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677-78.
124. Id. at 2683.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 2684.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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to comply with ICJ rulings in cases in which they were parties, it did not
contemplate judicial enforcement at all. The "remedies" were "quintessentially international";
non-compliance was a matter for the Security
30
Council. 1
In addition, the Chief Justice noted, the United States had withdrawn
from the Optional Protocol. The views of the Executive Branch traditionally carried "'great weight"' in treaty interpretation, and it was
"doubtful that our courts should give decisive weight to the interpretation of a tribunal whose jurisdiction" the United States "no longer recognized."' 13 1 While the Executive Branch had decided to "'discharge its
international obligations'
by "having state courts give effect
to.. .Avena" in cases involving Mexican nationals, it had "not taken the
view that the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 [was] binding on our
courts." 132 Indeed, the Executive Branch had filed an amicus brief arguing that the ICJ rulings were not binding on American judges--except
insofar as the President had decided, based on his own constitutional
133
and statutory authority, that such judgments should be enforced.
Even granting its rulings "respectful consideration," the ICJ had interpreted the VCCR incorrectly.134 Breard was right: procedural default
rules could block the assertion of claims under the treaty. The ICJ had
reasoned that such rules could prevent domestic courts from giving
"'full effect"' to the purposes for which the VCCR had granted rights to
foreign nationals, as the VCCR required. 135 But this reasoning "overlook[ed] the importance of procedural default rules in an adversary system," like the United States', "which relie[d] chiefly on the parties to
raise significant issues and present them to the courts in the appropriate
manner at the appropriate time."'1 36 Procedural default rules were fundamental to such a system; they extended to most of the claims criminal
defendants might raise, including bedrock constitutional claims. 137 If the
ICJ's interpretation of the treaty were correct, VCCR claims would be

130. Id. at 2684-85.
131. Id. at 2685.
132. Id. (quoting Bush memorandum).
133. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 43-46,
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566) [hereinafter U.S.
Amicus Brief].
134. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2685.
135. Id. (quoting VCCR art. 36, para. 2).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2686, 2688.
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entitled to an exception available for "almost no other right."' 38 Such a
reading was implausible, especially given the VCCR's requirement that

foreign nationals exercise their rights39 "'in conformity with the laws and

regulations of the receiving State."1
Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to concur in the Court's judgment. 140 She did not take an express position on the effect of the ICJ

judgments. 14 Even if procedural default rules were problematic in some
circumstances, she believed, they were not problematic in SanchezLlamas. 142 For example, the ICJ had indicated that procedural default
rules could not be applied in situations where local authorities' conduct
itself had caused the default.' 43 Sanchez-Llamas did not present such a
situation. Petitioner conceded that his lawyer had known of his VCCR
claim at trial; nothing the local authorities had done had prevented the
lawyer from raising the VCCR claim in the initial proceeding. 44 Even
on the ICJ's theory, there was no reason to order reconsideration of petitioner's conviction.
Justice Breyer dissented in an opinion that Justices Stevens and

Souter joined, and that Justice Ginsburg joined in part. 14 Unlike the
Court, which did not reach the question, he concluded that the VCCR
conferred individually enforceable rights on foreign nationals. 14 6 Moreover, Justice Breyer believed that the VCCR precluded the application
of local procedural default rules in some circumstances. While he spent
some time on the treaty itself, 147 most of his discussion on this point
dealt with the proper effect of the ICJ rulings. He argued that the Court
138. Id. at 2688.
139. Id. at 2686 (quoting VCCR art. 36, para. 2).
140. Id. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
141. Justice Ginsburg did join part I of Justice Breyer's dissent, on the individually enforceable rights point, which relies in part on the ICJ opinions. Id. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
the judgment). Most of Justice Breyer's discussion on the effect of ICJ judgments is in part Ill of
his opinion, though, and Justice Ginsburg did not join that part. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
the judgment).
142. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Ginsburg agreed with the
Court that allowing procedural default rules to apply to important constitutional claims, but not to
VCCR claims, "would be extraordinary." Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
144. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
145. Id. at 2690 (Breyer, J., dissenting). I do not discuss Justice Breyer's analysis of the suppression issue, which did not concern the effect of ICJ opinions.
146. Id. at 2693-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This part of Justice Breyer's opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined, discusses the effect of ICJ opinions only in passing. See id. at 2696-97
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2698-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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had failed to give LaGrand
and Avena the "respectful consideration"
148
that Breardrequired.
Justice Breyer assumed that ICJ opinions did not formally "bind" the
Supreme Court. 14 9 But "respectful consideration" suggested that the
Court should adopt an interpretation "consistent with the ICJ's reading
of the Convention." 150 Uniformity was "an important goal of treaty interpretation" and the ICJ "provide[d] a natural point of reference for national courts seeking that uniformity."' 5 1 Moreover, the ICJ had "expertise in.. .treaty interpretation" and international law generally. 52 Indeed,
Justice Breyer provided a list of more than forty cases in which the Supreme Court and lower American courts purportedly had "looked to the
ICJ for guidance" in the past. 153 (As the Court noted, and as I shall explain, this list was greatly exaggerated.) 154 Here, by contrast, the Court
had adopted an interpretation of the VCCR that differed from the ICJ's.
The Court had thereby
created a "conflict" that Justice Breyer called
"unprecedented."1 55
To give the ICJ opinions "respectful consideration," Justice Breyer
argued, the Court must "read [them] in light of the [VCCR]'s underlying language and purposes and ask whether, or to what extent, they require modification" of local procedural rules. 156 The Court had failed to
read the ICJ opinions fairly. It had "overlook[ed] what the ICJ actually
said, overstate[d] what it actually meant, and [was] inconsistent with
what it actually did."' 157 Read narrowly, LaGrand and Avena only precluded application of procedural default rules in limited circumstances:
where the actions of local authorities had prevented a foreign national
from raising a VCCR claim in a timely way and no effective remedy
remained. 158 Other, broader readings of the opinions were possible, but
this narrow understanding was a "perfectly reasonable" one. 159 By fail-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2701-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2685 n.5.
Id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2702-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ing to adopt that understanding, the Court had denied the ICJ judgments
"respectful consideration."' 60
In his opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice had chided Justice
Breyer for giving less than "respectful consideration" to the Court's
own earlier holding in Breard.16 1 But Justice Breyer responded that
Breard did not pose an obstacle to adopting the ICJ's views. Several
factors distinguished the earlier case. For example, Breard had dealt
with procedural default in federal courts, not state courts; 162 it was a
rushed per curiam decision that the Court had reached in "the few hours
available between the time a petition for certiorari was filed and a
scheduled execution."'' 63 By adopting a small qualification-namely,
that procedural default rules could be blocked in some circumstancesone could read Breard as consistent with LaGrand and Avena. 164 "[I]n
any event," Justice Breyer concluded, the ICJ's subsequent rulings were
significant legal developments that
justified reconsidering Breard under
165
standard stare decisis principles.

II.

UNDERSTANDING SANCHEZ-LLAMAS

Because the Court and the dissent agree that ICJ rulings merit "respectful consideration," one might dismiss the split in Sanchez-Llamas
as minor. But that would be a superficial reading of the case. The Chief
Justice and Justice Breyer use the same phrase, but they envision radically different approaches to international judgments. In fact, each of
the main opinions in Sanchez-Llamas reflects one side of the larger debate that has occupied the academy for the past decade. The Court's
opinion reflects a dualist approach, under which international judgments
have "information" rather than "disposition value" for domestic courts.
By contrast, the dissent adopts the comity model that has gained considerable academic currency in recent years. Under this model, domestic
courts defer to international judgments, where possible, in the interests
of justice and global uniformity. In this Part, I show how the main opinions in Sanchez-Llamas reflect the wider scholarly debate and argue that
the Court was correct to reject the comity model.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2683 n.4.
Id. at 2703-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Court's Opinion and the DualistApproach

The Court's opinion analyzes the effect of an ICJ judgment as follows. Under the Constitution, American courts have the ultimate authority to determine the meaning of a treaty the United States has made with
a foreign country. If the ICJ expresses views on the question, American
judges should pay attention. But an ICJ judgment does not "control[]"
domestic courts. 166 If American judges disagree with the ICJ's interpretation of a treaty, they may disregard it. To be sure, as a UN member,
the United States has an international obligation to comply with an ICJ
judgment in a case to which it is a party; by failing to enforce an ICJ
judgment in a particular case, the United States would expose itself to
remedies at the UN. 167 But the ICJ's interpretation
of a treaty does not
68
generally.'
more
courts
American
bind
Dualism-which, despite substantial academic criticism, remains
"[t]he prevalent theoretical approach to the relationship between international and municipal law"169-provides an underpinning for this
analysis. Dualism teaches that international and domestic regimes exist
on separate planes. 170 Each operates independently of the other; each
71
has "power to settle the effect of any outside rule of law... within it."'
In the domestic sphere, domestic actors alone have power to determine
the effect of international obligations. In the absence of a domestic decision to adopt it-what scholars call an act of incorporation-an international obligation lacks domestic force. 172 In the context of international
judgments, dualism suggests that the reasoning of an international tribunal cannot provide a rule of decision that acts as binding precedent for
domestic judges.
To understand the domestic effect of international judgments under
dualism, it is helpful to distinguish between two types of authority that
sources might have for a court resolving a legal question. First, a source
might have "information value."' 73 The source might offer data for a
166. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684.
167. Id. at 2684-85.
168. See id. at 2684.
169. JANIS, supra note 60, at 85.
170. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 151-52 (2001); see also Jan
Klabbers, InternationalLaw in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect, 21 Y.B.
EUR. L. 263, 273 (2002) ("Dualists... argue typically that international and domestic law are separate spheres of law, not hierarchically organized in any way.").
171. JANIS, supra note 60, at 85.
172. BEDERMAN, supra note 170, at 151-52.
173. See McGinnis, supra note 21, at 310 (discussing "informational value" of authority).
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court to use in making its decision: relevant facts, historical background,
or trenchant analysis. In determining how much information value a
particular source might have, the court would naturally consider a number of factors, including, importantly, the level of expertise that the
source reflected. A treatise by a particularly renowned scholar, for example, would have more information value than an article by someone
without much background in the field. The source would not, however,
create any obligations on its own. It would have value only to the extent
it represented a sound approach to the problem.
Second, a source might have "disposition value."'' 74 The source might
influence the outcome of a case by virtue of its own inherent authority.
For example, in the United States, an applicable federal statute determines the result of a case, not because it is wise or well written, but because Congress has enacted it. Similarly, a Supreme Court opinion
binds lower courts, not because of the quality of its reasoning, but because it represents the decision of the nation's highest judicial power. A
source has disposition value, then, by virtue of its status, irrespective of
other qualities. A court must defer to the source, regardless of what the
court thinks
of its reasoning, because of the source's own "intrinsic
175
weight."'
On a dualist understanding-absent an act of incorporationinternational judgments can have only information value. Domestic
courts can adopt the reasoning of particular international judgments, just
as they can adopt the reasoning of other sources, if they find it persuasive. They can fall in line with what they see as superior analysis,
greater learning, or more substantial experience. But international
judgments lack disposition value. They cannot influence the outcome of
domestic litigation, the way domestic precedents can, by virtue of their
own authority. They cannot dispose of a case on the basis of their status
as superior judicial pronouncements.
One can readily see how dualism informs the Court's opinion in Sanchez-Llamas. For the Chief Justice, giving ICJ judgments "respectful
consideration" meant looking to them for information value. If the ICJ's
interpretation of the VCCR were sound, the Court could endorse it; if
not, the Court could reject it. As it turned out, the Court believed that
the information value of the ICJ judgments was small. After examining
the opinions in LaGrandand Avena, the Court concluded that the ICJ
174. Id.
175. Id.
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had wrongly interpreted the VCCR. 176 As a result, it rejected the ICJ's
interpretation and stuck to its own earlier analysis in Breard. Giving
greater weight to the ICJ's views-holding that they were "controlling"
even though the Court did not agree with them-would have been
equivalent to granting the1 ICJ
judgments a kind of disposition value, a
77
result that dualism rejects.
Scholars sometimes dismiss dualism as reductive or parochial. 178 But
the Court's opinion represents a sensible and moderate approach to the
sort of international judgments at issue in the case. To see why, one has
to appreciate that international courts present both promises and risks.
On the plus side, international courts offer at least three potential benefits. First, they can promote uniformity in treaty interpretation. 179 In the
context of a multilateral treaty like the VCCR, a single tribunal with the
power to render binding interpretations can prevent states from adopting
divergent readings. 80 Uniformity promotes predictability, which itself
serves a vital function in a legal regime.' 8 1 If governments want to comply with a treaty's requirements, they need to know for sure what those
requirements are. Similarly, private parties attempting to conform to a
treaty need to know how the treaty applies to them. Divergent national
opinions can only create obstacles for such parties, especially if they
engage in international commerce.' 82 Particularly in that context, inter176. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685.
177. See id. at 2684 (arguing that ICJ opinions are not "controlling on [American] courts").
178. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 24, at 517 (arguing that dualism is based on an "anachronistic ... isolationism and unilateralism"). See generally Bradley, Dualist Constitution, supra note
7, at 531 (discussing the rejection of dualist thought "in the American international law academy").
179. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudenceand a
Callfor Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1936-41 (2005) (discussing value of international uniformity in treaty interpretation).
180. See Bradley & Damrosch, supra note 26, at 693 (comments of Prof Damrosch) (discussing the "virtue" of uniformity created by ICJ interpretation of the VCCR); Van Alstine, supra
note 179, at 1938-39 n.367 (criticizing the Supreme Court's failure to honor the ICJ's ruling in
Breard).
181. See Karin L. Kizery, Comment, Minding the Gap: DeterminingInterest Rates Under the
U.N. Convention for the InternationalSale of Goods, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1998) (noting that the "uniformity" of the Convention for the International Sale of Goods "makes [international] transactions more predictable").
182. See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalSales
Law, 25 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 446, 448 (2005) ("Commercial interests.. .require legal certainty
and predictability so that parties involved in international trade are able to price the risks, including legal risks, that their contracts entail."); Paul B. Stephan, The Futilityof Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 746 (1999) (discussing
problems that divergent national rules pose for international commerce).
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national tribunals can help reduce legal uncertainty that might otherwise
83
retard international transactions.
Second, international courts can help promote compliance by correcting for power imbalances among treaty signatories.' 84 For example, in
the VCCR context, smaller nations have comparatively little leverage to
prevent or redress treaty violations by larger countries like the United
States. Smaller countries may lack the capacity to retaliate diplomatically for American violations; in the great scheme of things, the usefulness of a friendly relationship with the United States probably outweighs the benefits of expelling American consuls or denying them
access to American arrestees.185 If ICJ interpretations bound American
courts, that might improve the chances for compliance.' 86 Whatever the
realities of international politics, American courts would have to implement American treaty obligations, at least as the ICJ understood
them.
Third, to the extent that international judges have greater expertise
than their domestic counterparts, international courts can help improve
the quality of reasoning in international law.1 87 International judges
might well have a comparative advantage when it comes to international
law. 188 International law often seems opaque to those who lack experience with it, and, until relatively recently, most American judges did not
have to deal very much with international materials. 189 Moreover, inter183. Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 731
(1998) ("The very purpose of .. commercial law conventions, after all, is to develop and bring
uniformity to the law governing international transactions."). Cf Susan Choi, Effects of International Arbitral Tribunals in National Courts (1), in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS, supra note
27, at 147, 170 (arguing that recognition of "the needs of the commercial system for predictability" in dispute resolution might cause national courts to enforce the awards of international arbitration panels).
184. For a discussion of a similar argument in the WTO context, see Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (2003).
185. See McGuinness, supra note 8, at 840-41.
186. Cf Martinez, supra note 2, at 500 (suggesting that national courts' failure to enforce international court judgments "would undermine cooperative international frameworks and encourage noncompliance with international law").
187. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51 (2006) ("Within a broader
institutional and legal framework, international courts have the ability and expertise to take principles negotiated and developed by states and increase their precision and applicability to contemporary circumstances.").
188. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 493.
189. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191, 191 (1995/1996) (discussing the unfamiliarity of international law
for American judges).
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national law has become more specialized and technical in recent
years; 190 generalist domestic judges often lack time to give it the sustained attention it requires. To be sure, as international law becomes a
larger part of their work, domestic judges will likely develop expertise
to match that of international courts.' 9 1 For the moment, though, the
comparative expertise of international jurists offers another reason to
defer to international judgments.
On the other hand, international courts raise significant concerns
about legitimacy. First, they suffer from a "democratic deficit."'1 92
Members of international tribunals are selected with very little popular
participation.' 93 Typically, international organizations far removed from
national communities appoint international judges. These organizations
use selection procedures that are "opaque" or even secretivecharacteristics held over from diplomatic dispute-settlement. 194 National
delegations can represent the views and interests of their constituents,
but, for reasons I will explain, this representation may be quite attenuated. Moreover, many nations that participate in international organiza95
tions are themselves not democracies, or even aspiring democracies.
The sometimes substantial input of these countries in judicial selection
hardly advances democratic accountability.
Of course, domestic courts also suffer from a democratic deficit. In
the United States, for example, citizens do not directly choose federal
judges; indeed, the Constitution creates filters precisely to limit popular
190. See Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919, 923 (1999).
191. See Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferationof InternationalDispute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 230
(2002) ("As they become more familiar with international law, domestic lawyers and judges become more comfortable applying it in a variety of cases.").
192. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 908 (2005) (noting that "increased power" of international courts
to review national decisions raises "legitimacy... concerns," including "democratic deficits in the
operation of international courts"); cf Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2010-11 (2004) (discussing anti-democratic implications of international
tribunals).
193. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of InternationalDecision-Making, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 51 (2003).
194. Danner, supra note 187, at 49-50 (discussing argument that "international judges.. are
relatively unaccountable" and "subject to opaque selection procedures"); see also Donoho, supra
note 193, at 51 (noting that international judicial "appointments are essentially still a function of
international relations").
195. Cf McGinnis, supra note 21, at 315 (discussing how the absence of "democratic bona
fides" on the part of some signatories of international treaties exacerbates the democratic deficit
of much international law).
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participation in the selection process. But accountability problems loom
much larger at the international level. 96 For example, while American
citizens do not have direct influence on domestic judicial selection, they
at least know the actors. Voters can punish politicians who stray too far
from their views on judicial nominees; indeed, judicial appointments increasingly figure in national election campaigns. 97 By contrast, international judicial selection is much more remote. Citizens are much less
likely to understand the ins and outs of international organizations and
monitor their representatives at global forums.1 98 As a result, their ability to influence international judicial selection is much more circumscribed.
Second, international courts lack the ties of civic identity, history,
and legal culture that often make the decisions of domestic courts acceptable to national communities. 199 Domestic courts function as parts
of encompassing political structures to which people feel significant
loyalty. 20 0 For example, the United States Supreme Court draws its authority from the United States Constitution, America's organic political
text. By contrast, international courts are elements of global arrangements that seem quite distant to most people. 20 1 As a result, international courts cannot appeal, the way domestic courts can, to a sense of
civic responsibility-an obligation to comply with judicial rulings, even
if one disagrees with them, by virtue of one's duty as a citizen. 2 2 Similarly, international judges cannot draw on historical memory the way
196. See Donoho, supra note 193, at 51 (contrasting international judicial selection with federal judicial appointments in the United States).
197. See, e.g., Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress's Past Powerand Present
Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L. REV. 678, 719-20 (2006) (discussing the
politicization of Supreme Court appointments).
198. See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should InternationalLaw Be Partof Our Law?, 59
STAN L. REV. 1175 (2007).
199. See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization:
Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 816 (1999) (discussing the nature of the WTO).
200. Cf David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of InternationalCourts and Tribunals,
24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 410 (2006) (arguing that, in contrast to international courts, domestic courts generally are "deeply woven into the social fabric").
201. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 603 (2005) (noting that "[a]n international institution" like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda might "constitute 'a rather distant
reality"' for local populations) (citation omitted).
202. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 228 (2004) (discussing contemporary American "acceptance of judicial
authority").
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their domestic counterparts can. Citizens often know and respect the
important role that domestic courts have played in national controversies; consider the role that Brown v. Board of Education plays in the
American psyche.2 °3 International courts, by contrast, can draw on no
such sense of shared experience with national populations.
Moreover, unlike domestic judges, international judges may not share
much in the way of legal culture with the parties that appear before
them. Domestic judges and the lawyers who argue cases before them are
products of a single legal culture. They have had similar educations and
share pretty much the same starting assumptions; their reasoning moves,
for the most part, along similar lines. 20 4 By contrast, international judges
come from a range of legal systems.20 5 Apart from very basic notions
about respect for the rule of law-a principle itself open to divergent
understandings-these systems may well have different starting assumptions, modes of reasoning, and professional norms.20 6 The potential for misunderstanding and conflict is much greater. At the very least,
international judgments are more likely than domestic judgments to
seem alien and misguided to local populations.
Third, compared to domestic courts, international courts have less
ability to adapt their jurisprudence to specific local conditions. Even
domestic litigation is a blunt tool for addressing social problems,20 7 but
domestic judges have advantages that international judges lack. They
can draw on their familiarity with local conditions to avoid decisions
that pose unnecessary obstacles to government actors.20 8 They can take
account of social and political realities in gauging whether rulings will
upset expectations or cast doubt on settled principles. One cannot expect
international judges, who after all are pretty far removed from local
203. See id. at 229.
204. See Frederick Schauer, Book Review, The Determinants of Legal Doubt, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1295, 1297 (1991) (reviewing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA

(Paul Gewirtz ed.) (Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989)).
205. See Donoho, supra note 193, at 52.
206. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
449, 459-60 (2000) (discussing the absence of a "common legal culture" at the international
level); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 192, at 1975 (arguing that "constitutionalism" means opposite things to Americans and Europeans: Americans tend to think of constitutionalism as resting
ultimately on democratic consent, while Europeans think of it primarily as a check on democracy).
207. See James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A CommunitarianDefense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 808 (1993).
208. See Yuval Shany, How Supreme Is the Supreme Law of the Land? ComparativeAnalysis
of the Influence of InternationalHuman Rights Treaties upon the Interpretationof Constitutional
Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 350 (2006).
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concerns, to exercise the same sensitivity.2 °9 International judges must
decide abstract questions on the basis of broadly worded treaties that
cannot fully account for local exigencies. 2'0 They have less capacity to
tailor their decisions to fit local circumstances.
The fact that international courts increasingly rule on sensitive local
subjects only heightens these concerns. Since the end of the Second
World War, the reach of international law has extended to areas once
thought to be core domestic prerogatives, for example, civil and political rights, criminal law and punishment, economic regulation, environmental protection, and public health and safety.2 11 In areas like these,
law often expresses deep social norms. 2t 2 Moreover, opinions vary
greatly from region to region and from country to country. For example,
developing countries, whose standards of living are relatively low, often
place a higher value on economic growth, and a lesser value on environmental protection, than developed countries.2 13 Traditional cultures
tend to be more comfortable with the death penalty, and less comfortable with Western concepts of family and gender, than more liberal and
secular societies.21 4 More and more, international judgments affect areas
where the legitimacy deficit seems most acute.
The dualist approach allows domestic courts to mediate these benefits
and risks in the context of particular cases. Domestic courts can weigh
the benefits of uniformity, predictability, and comparative expertise.
When appropriate, they can adopt the reasoning of international tribunals. At the same time, the dualist approach helps prevent situations in
which relatively illegitimate international actors make decisions that
bind local populations, particularly when those decisions implicate sen209. See Shany, supra note 192, at 920 n.78 (noting that national courts are "'in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions') (citation omitted).
210. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO,
45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 361 (2004).
211. See, e.g., William H. Taft, IV, A View from the Top: American Perspectives on International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 503, 503 (2006) (discussing "the growth of

international law and its influence in the decades following World War II"); see also Young, supra note 5, at 1151-52 (explaining that modem international law, which international courts apply, "replicates many central concerns of the domestic regulatory state").
212. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
421-25 (1999) (discussing the expressive value of criminal law).
213. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511, 553-54 (2000) (explaining why countries at different levels of development "rationally choose different regulatory standards").
214. See Barbara Stark, Baby Girlsfrom China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 1231, 1254 (discussing the "inherent tensions in human rights law, especially when human rights norms conflict with traditional cultural values").

96

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 48:1

sitive local concerns. 215 By denying international judgments disposition
value, it minimizes the occasion for nationalist backlashes216that can only
lessen the beneficial contributions of international courts.
Sanchez-Llamas demonstrates the value of the dualist approach. Few
advantages would have followed from adopting the ICJ's view that the
VCCR barred local procedural default rules. The interests in uniform
treaty interpretation were slight. Uniformity is important primarily because it promotes predictability, allowing governments and regulated
parties to plan their conduct. But governments, including the United
States', knew that a failure to notify foreign detainees of their Article 36
rights violated the treaty; the United States had conceded as much before the ICJ. 2 17 And private planning was not a relevant issue. The ability to bypass procedural default rules if local authorities failed to notify
their consulates of their arrest surely did not influence the decisions of
foreign nationals like Avena and the LaGrand brothers to travel to the
United States and commit crimes there.
Nor was there reason to think that the ICJ had a comparative advantage over domestic courts in understanding the VCCR. The treaty did
not require specialized knowledge; its text and negotiating history were
equally accessible to international and domestic judges. 21 8 Finally, there
was no evidence that adopting the ICJ's reasoning would have led to
greater compliance by the United States. The United States was already
taking steps to improve compliance with Article 36, including efforts to
educate local police departments that even the ICJ termed "considerable. '21 9 The President already had ordered state courts to implement
Avena in cases involving Mexican nationals. 220 If giving ICJ judgments
disposition value would have added any incentives for American implementation of the VCCR, they could only have been marginal.

215. Cf Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679, 695 (1999) (suggesting that international tribunals may lack legitimacy to "second-guess local decisions" in sensitive human
rights matters).
216. For a study of one example of a nationalist backlash against an international tribunal, see
Heifer, supra note 7.
217. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 473 (June 27).
218. The Sanchez-Llamas Court, for example, adverted to the VCCR's text and drafting history, as well as the "contemporary practice of other signatories," in reaching its conclusion about
the VCCR's application. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006).
219. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 68 (Mar. 31). For a
description of these efforts, see U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 133, at 25 n.8.
220. See Bush Memorandum, supra note 103.
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By contrast, granting disposition value to the ICJ judgments would
have raised significant legitimacy concerns. The ICJ suffers from a serious democratic deficit. Its judges are selected in a complex process far
removed from popular oversight. Potential judges are nominated, in lists
of up to four names, by "national groups" at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. 221 Although national governments appoint them,
these groups do not necessarily take instruction from home. For example, the American group occasionally operates independently of domestic political influence.22 2 Rather, the group "consults with professional
bodies like the American Society of International Law in making its
recommendations, and its members are sometimes visited by representatives of foreign states who wish the U.S. national group to join in nominating one of their nationals. 2 23 Indeed, the ICJ Statute omits domestic
political authorities from the resources it recommends that national
groups consult in making nominations, referring them instead to high
court judges and professors of international law.224
Once the national groups have drawn up their lists, the General Assembly and Security Council elect the Court's members, voting separately and by simple majority.22 5 Domestic governments do have a say
at this stage of the process. National delegations interview candidates
and vet their past opinions; a fair amount of horse trading takes place. 226
Still, popular input is lacking. For example, American citizens, even
well informed American citizens, pay little attention to the selection
process. Americans voice general support for the United Nations, but
they know little about the organization's internal workings; it is hard to
imagine22 7them following the ins and outs of politicking over ICJ
judges.
The lack of democratic accountability undoubtedly would have hurt
the ICJ's credibility with American citizens. Moreover, the Court's
221. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 4.
222. See Davis R. Robinson, The Role of Politics in the Election and Work of Judges of the
InternationalCourt ofJustice, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 277, 279 (2003).
223. Id.
224. ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 6.
225. SHAW, supra note 46, at 961-962.
226. See id. at 961; Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, InternationalCourts and Tribunals
and the Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 278-79 (2003).
227. See, e.g., Jane E. Stromseth, Book Review and Note, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 797, 798 (2000)
(reviewing EDWARD C. LUCK, MIXED MESSAGES: AMERICAN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION 1919-1999 (1999)) (discussing Luck's view that "although Americans generally
favor U.S. involvement in the United Nations, they have limited knowledge of that organization
and its activities").
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composition would have made it seem quite alien. The United Nations
customarily allocates spaces on the Court unofficially by regionAfrica; Asia; Latin America; Western Europe, the United States and
Commonwealth countries; and Eastern Europe-with five slots going to
the permanent members of the Security Council.22 8 At the time of
Avena, the Court had members from China, Egypt, Jordan, Madagascar,
Russia, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela.2 29 These were no doubt accomplished jurists, but they represented legal cultures quite remote from the
United States'. Given the composition of its bench, the ICJ could not
plausibly rely on ties of history and legal culture to impart credibility to
its views about the application of the VCCR.
The diversity of legal backgrounds also would have opened the ICJ to
the criticism that it lacked familiarity with the American justice system.
Indeed, the Sanchez-Llamas Court argued that the ICJ had misunderstood, and failed to adapt its reasoning to, the American experience. In
holding that the VCCR preempted local procedural default rules, the
Chief Justice wrote, the ICJ had confused the American adversary system with the inquisitorial regimes that exist in other countries. An inquisitorial regime relies on a magistrate to collect evidence; in such a
regime, "the failure to raise a legal error can in part be attributed to the
magistrate, and thus to the state itself., 230 In the American system, by
contrast, the parties themselves have the responsibility "to raise significant issues and present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at
the appropriate time. ' 23 1 Procedural default rules were thus an essential
part of the American system; indeed, they applied to fundamental constitutional protections like Miranda claims.2 32 Holding that procedural
default rules could not apply to VCCR claims was "inconsistent with
the basic framework of' American criminal justice.23 3

228. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 603 (2005).
229. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 14 (Mar. 31)
(describing the composition of the Court). The complete bench at the time of the Avena judgment
consisted of President Shi (China), Vice President Ranjeva (Madagascar), and Judges Guillaume
(France), Koroma (Sierra Leone), Vereshchetin (Russia), Higgins (United Kingdom), ParraAranguren (Venezuela), Kooijmans (Netherlands), Rezek (Brazil), A1-Kasawneh (Jordan), Buergenthal (United States), Elaraby (Egypt), Owada (Japan), Tomka (Slovakia), and Sep6lveda
(Mexico).
230. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2686 (2006).
231. Id. at 2685.
232. Id. at 2687.
233. Id. at 2686.
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Finally, one must consider that Sanchez-Llamas, like the other VCCR
cases before it, involved criminal punishment for serious offenses-and,
at least indirectly, the death penalty.2 3 4 One can hardly imagine subjects
more sensitive, or more at the core of traditional governmental authority, than these. In these areas, domestic communities would be especially likely to see ICJ judgments as unacceptable intrusions. Indeed, the
suggestion that its judgments might bind American courts with respect
to such matters already had caused a backlash against the ICJ. As we
have seen, the governors of Virginia and Arizona refused to comply
with the ICJ's orders to stay the execution of foreign nationals, the former stating that he would not "transfer[]" authority over the state's
criminal process to the international court. 235 Following Avena, the
Bush Administration withdrew from the Optional Protocol entirely, objecting that it was "not appropriate" for the ICJ to intervene in the
2 36 The ICJ had its supporters too, 237
American criminal justice process.
but it seems fair to predict that deferring to the ICJ in Sanchez-Llamas
would have sparked further opposition to the tribunal and to international courts more generally.
In sum, the potential benefits of adopting the ICJ's reasoning were
slight and the potential costs substantial. Given this lopsided balance,
the Court correctly rejected the ICJ's arguments and stuck to its own
views about the VCCR. Of course, one might object to the dualist approach. Three potential objections seem particularly relevant. First, one
might question whether domestic judges should have the ultimate say on
whether to adopt the reasoning of the ICJ. After all, the United States
had committed to ICJ jurisdiction in the Optional Protocol, and one
might think that its decision to do so was the only act of incorporation
that dualism requires. 238 Allowing domestic courts to decide whether to
go along with eventual ICJ judgments might seem to take dualism a step

234. See McGuinness, supra note 8, at 757.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79 (discussing actions of the Virginia governor);
text accompanying note 86 (discussing actions of the Arizona governor).
236. Daily Press Briefing, supra note 107. As Scott and Stephan argue, the Bush Administration's decision reflects dismay at the idea that the Supreme Court might actually hold that ICJ
opinions bind American courts. See ROBERT E. SCOrr & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF
LEVIATHAN 176-77 (2006).

237. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (discussing reaction of the Oklahoma governor to the ICJ stay order in the Torres litigation).
238. Cf Bradley & Damrosch, supra note 26, at 676-77 (comments of Prof. Damrosch) (discussing effect of United States' agreement to the Optional Protocol).
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too far-to
be a bad faith attempt to renege on American commit23 9

ments.

Second, the dualist approach, as I have described it, might seem too
indeterminate. Information value seems a vague concept; unless one
specifies the precise factors to consider in deciding whether to adopt the
reasoning of an international tribunal, the phrase leaves domestic judges
pretty much at sea. Given the already vague nature of much international law, this indeterminacy could pose a serious problem. 24' Finally,
even if they were acting competently and in good faith, one might question whether domestic judges have the capacity to appreciate fully the
benefits of deferring to the ICJ. Their narrow worldview and lack of expertise-their parochialism-might cause them to discount the value of
cooperation and create unnecessary obstacles to the international tribunal.241
These are plausible objections, but they do not pose insurmountable
problems for the Court's approach. As to the first, one must appreciate
the nature of the "act of incorporation" the United States took when it
consented to ICJ jurisdiction. When the United States ratified the Optional Protocol, it understood that any eventual ICJ decisions would
have effect internationally, not domestically.24 2 Allowing domestic
courts to decide for themselves whether to adopt the ICJ's reasoning
does not renege on any American commitment, properly understood. On
the contrary, allowing ICJ judgments to have disposition value would
violate the United States' legitimate expectations.
The second two objections really relate to the capacity of domestic
judges to do their jobs in a sensible way. One should not overtax judges,
but the dualist approach does not impose particularly onerous burdens.
True, several factors might influence a decision to adopt the reasoning
of a particular international judgment, including the intrusiveness of the
issue, the reputation and experience of the tribunal, and the participation
of the United States.24 3 Given the nature of the judicial enterprise, it is
239. Cf Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 362 n.316
(2006) (arguing that the refusal to apply Avena's reasoning to persons not covered by the judgment would reflect "a thin and formalist conception of equality and the rule of law").
240. See generally Young, supra note 5, at 1248 (discussing the indeterminacy of international law).
241. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 444 (discussing problems that judicial parochialism could
cause for the international judicial system).
242. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (discussing the "quintessentially international"nature of the remedies for non-compliance with ICJ decisions).
243. Cf Bradley, supra note 20, at 110 (discussing role of US participation in deciding
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impossible to catalog and rank all the factors ahead of time. But indeterminacy is true of many legal doctrines, 2 44 and there is no reason to
think that this particular decision is too vague to give to domestic
judges. Moreover, some court will have to decide what role international judgments should have domestically. If not a domestic court, the
ultimate decision maker will be the international tribunal itself. International courts have their own deficiencies, and correcting mistakes they
make will not be so easy. 24 5 Given the legitimacy problems I have discussed, allowing domestic judges the final say on adopting the reasoning of international judgments seems the safer option.
B.

The Dissent and the Comity Model

As we have seen, Justice Breyer used the same phrase as the Court to
describe the proper treatment of ICJ judgments: "respectful consideration. ' 246 But for him the phrase suggested a more profound obligation.
While the Court believed that it could disregard the ICJ's arguments if it
found them unpersuasive, he maintained that the Court should have
adopted an interpretation "consistent with the ICJ's reading of the Convention. ' 24 7 Given the important interest in uniform treaty interpretation
and the tribunal's comparative expertise in international law, the Court
should have avoided a clash with the ICJ; it should have endorsed the
ICJ's reading of Article 36, even if that meant qualifying its own earlier
ruling in Breard. Instead, the Court had rejected the ICJ's views,
thereby creating an "unprecedented" conflict with the international tribunal .248
Although he does not expressly refer to it, Breyer's reasoning reflects
the comity model that has gained considerable academic currency in recent years. 249 Different versions of the model exist; supporters do not
focus on the same tribunals or stress precisely the same factors. Nonetheless, there are enough similarities to make a composite picture possiwhether ICJ's reasoning should bind American courts).
244. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
JudicialFederalismAfter Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1469 (1997) (discussing work of H.L.A.

Hart).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 192-214 (discussing the legitimacy problems of international courts).
246. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2697.
248. Id. at 2702.
249. See supra note 23 (discussing scholarship that employs comity ideas in analyzing international judgments).
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ble. At its core, the model contemplates a cooperative relationship between international and national tribunals-a "dialogue ' 250 or "community of courts." 25 As participants in this dialogue, international courts
do not coerce domestic courts into enforcing their judgments.25 2 Rather,
they persuade them by the power of their reasoning, their comparative
expertise, and their engagement in the shared enterprise of2judging3
Supporters believe that the comity model promotes the benefits of international courts while avoiding legitimacy concerns. By working with
their international counterparts, domestic courts can encourage uniformity and stability in international law; 254 by engaging in a "jurisgenerative
dialogue," 255 they can benefit from international courts' expertise and
improve the quality of their own reasoning. 6 Moreover, because the
model does not oblige domestic courts to enforce international judgments, legitimacy concerns do not arise. A domestic court that adopts
the reasoning of an international court on a comity theory does not cede
its proper authority. 257 Rather, it decides, as an equal member of an adjudicative community, to embrace the solution suggested by a sister tribunal.
This emphasis on dialogue and community might lead one to think
that the model involves nothing more than earnest conversation among
judges. But supporters envision something more rigorous. Although international judgments do not bind domestic courts, the presumption is
that domestic courts will systematically, if informally, defer to them.
Some work makes this expectation explicit. For example, Martinez
writes that national courts should not "depart from" international judgments "without clearly articulating reasons for doing so. ' ' 258 Some work
suggests the presumption only implicitly, in the examples given to support the model. Two examples have particular prominence in the litera-

250. Martinez, supra note 2, at 466; see also Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2049-50 (discussing the
concept ofjudicial dialogue).
251. SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 68; see also Burke-White, supra note 7, at 91 (describing
the "vertical" but not "strictly hierarchical" relationships that "regulate the interactions between
national and supranational courts" in a "global community of courts").
252. See Slaughter, supra note 23, at 708-11.
253. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 68-69; Slaughter, supra note 27, at 55; see also BurkeWhite, supra note 7, at 95-96 (discussing the group identity ofjudges).
254. See Koh, supra note 23, at 48.
255. Martinez, supra note 2, at 466.
256. See Slaughter, supra note 27, at 62-63.
257. See Koh, supra note 23, at 46-47.
258. Martinez, supra note 2, at 495.
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ture: European regional courts and the American regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
In Europe, comity supporters focus on two regional courts, the ECJ
and the ECtHR.2 "9 These two courts are entirely independent, the creatures of different regional associations. The ECJ is the judicial organ of
the European Union (EU), a 25 member umbrella association with
wide-ranging regulatory powers. 260 The Court's jurisdiction extends
primarily to economic matters, but it has limited authority over some
aspects of criminal procedure, human rights, and immigration issues as
well.2 6 I The ECtHR exists under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
a 47 member organization that serves as a forum for the negotiation of
treaties among its members.26 2 The most important of these treaties is
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 263
(ECHR), which commits signatories to an extensive
list of human rights.

The ECJ has achieved a remarkable degree of influence in the EU by
means of the so called "preliminary ruling mechanism. ' ' 264 Article 234
of the EC Treaty authorizes the Court to issue preliminary rulings on
questions of European law that arise in national courts.26 5 Courts of last
259. For sources discussing the European example in the comity literature, see supra note 28.
260. CARTER ET AL., supra note 39, at 322 (stating that the EU is an "umbrella term"). Established in 1993, the EU covers three economic associations dating to the 1950s: the European
Economic Community, also known as the European Community (EC); the European Coal and
Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. JANIS, supra note 60, at 298. In
addition to these economic associations, the EU contemplates two other "pillars": a common approach to foreign and security concerns, and cooperation in justice and home affairs. See CARTER
ET AL., supra note 39, at 508-09.
261. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 39, at 327.
262. Council
of
Europe,
About
the
Council
of
Europe,
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last modified May 11, 2007). The Council's membership comprises the twenty-five EU countries, several post-Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, and two states (Azerbaijan and Turkey) outside the Council's European core. See
Council
of
Europe,
The
Council
of
Europe's
Member
States,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/AboutCoe/Memberstates/default.asp (last modified May 2007).
263. See JANIS, supra note 60, at 263-64.
264. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 9 (2001). On the

importance of the preliminary ruling mechanism in establishing the ECJ's influence, see Karen
Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 227, 228 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998);

Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 291-92.
265. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 234, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 33
[hereinafter
EC
Treaty],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/12002E.html. Specifically, this jurisdiction extends to
questions concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of
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resort must refer such questions to the ECJ; lower courts may do so if
they believe they need the ECJ's views in order to decide a case.26 6 Article 234 does not expressly require the referring court to comply with
the ECJ's ruling; it does not establish appellate review.26 7 Nonetheless,

its logic implies that the referring court must comply, and referring
courts in fact do comply in the large majority of cases. 268 Indeed, national courts view the reasoning of the ECJ as binding more generally. 269 "[D]espite the absence of a formal rule of stare decisis... Article

234 rulings
constitute binding precedents for national courts in later
270

cases."
For supporters, this "informal hierarchical relationship" 271 provides

an encouraging example of how the comity model might work in practice. Heifer and Slaughter offer an important account, one that Slaughter
has developed further in a recent book.2 72 They detail the factors that

have made ECJ "judgments as effective, for the most part, as national
court rulings. 273 One important factor has been the Court's careful
strategy of cooperation with national courts, 2 74 a strategy that has fostered an "increasingly intertwined" jurisprudence, despite the occasional
"tug of war." 275 Similarly, Martinez believes that the cooperative relationship between the ECJ and national judiciaries provides a "striking"
illustration of "the self-organizing power of courts. 2 76 She extols the
"long process of dialogue between national courts and the ECJ over the
EC institutions and the European Central Bank, and the interpretation of the statutes of certain
European organizations. Id.
266. Id.
267. See PHILIP RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION 198 (2001); Attanasio, supra note 28, at 379.
268. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 30, at 354-55. On the occasional reluctance of national
courts to refer matters to the ECJ and enforce its judgments, see Karen J. Alter, The European
Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?, 54 INT'L ORG. 489, 505-06,
514 (2000). See also Attanasio, supra note 28, at 380 (discussing the "reluctance" of some national courts to follow ECJ decisions).
269. See
The
Court
of
Justice
of
the
European
Communities,
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/indexcje.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (asserting
that a judgment in a preliminary ruling binds the national court that made the reference and also
"other national courts before which the same problem is raised").
270. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 30, at 354.
271. RAWORTH, supra note 267, at 199.
272. SLAUGHTER, supra note 7; Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note

7.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Helfer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 276.
See id. at 309-11.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 84.
Martinez, supra note 2, at 445.
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parameters of their relationship" that has led to the current orderly arrangement.27 7
The ECtHR also enjoys deference from national courts despite a lack
of formal appellate authority. The ECHR does not require national
courts to defer to ECtHR judgments; under the convention, the domestic
effect of the Court's judgments is a matter for domestic law. 278 Notwithstanding the absence of a formal obligation, however, national
courts routinely fall in line with ECtHR rulings, even if they must alter
their own case law to do so. 2 7 9 National courts not only comply with
specific judgments, they also "strive" more generally to conform to the
ECtHR's reasoning in cases in which their states were not parties. 280 As
one commentator writes, national courts "normally follow the interpretation given to the [ECHR] by the [ECtHR]. 281
Comity supporters point to the ECtHR's success with enthusiasm.
Here again, Helfer and Slaughter provide an important analysis. They
applaud the fact that the Court has "established itself as the final interpreter of the [ECHR]'s provisions" and has "witnessed its rulings
change the shape of domestic law, through.. .judicial decision. 2 82 They
credit it with adopting a cooperation strategy similar to the ECJ's-"a
genuine vertical dialogue between national judges and [ECtHR]
judges."2 83 This strategy has helped make the ECtHR's judgments "as
effective as those of any domestic court." 284 To be sure, national judiciaries "will not follow" the Court if it "moves too far out of line with a
prevailing domestic democratic consensus. 2 85 Nonetheless, Heifer and
277. Id. As an example of dialogue, Martinez cites the interaction between the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ in the Solange cases. Id. at 445-46. For other discussions of the cooperative or dialogic character of the interactions between the ECJ and national courts, see Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2157, and Jones, supra note 28, at 221, 244.
278. See Sims, supra note 29, at 645 ("The [ECtHR] is not empowered to give any direction
at all to national courts."); see also Ress, supra note 30, at 374.
279. See Ress, supra note 30, at 374, 378-79; Sims, supra note 29, at 640.
280. Holly Dawn Jarmul, Effects of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 247, 284.
281. Carl Baudenbacher, Globalization and the Judiciary, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353, 353
(2005); see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 80 (noting that the ECtHR "has become a source of
authoritative pronouncements on human rights law for national courts," even when "its role as
interpreter of the [ECHR] has not been recognized as a matter of domestic law").
282. Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 293.
283. SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 80; see Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication,
supra note 7,at 297-98.
284. Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 296 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
285. SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 82.
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Slaughter note with approval, the overall "rate of compliance by states
with the [ECtHR]'s rulings is extremely high. 2 86
Some commentators also believe that the American system for enforcing foreign judgments offers an illustration of how comity might
288
work on a global scale. 287 No treaty or federal law covers the subject.
Nonetheless, at least since the Supreme Court decided Hilton v. Guyot
in 1895,289 American courts routinely have enforced the judgments of
foreign courts. In Hilton, French plaintiffs attempted to enforce a French
judgment they had won against American defendants in a commercial
dispute. The Court explained that the French judgment did not bind
American courts. Nonetheless, American courts could enforce it as a
matter of "comity," which the Court defined as "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the.. .judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws., 290 Indeed, American courts generally should enforce foreign judgments, as long as the foreign court had afforded basic
procedural protections. 29 1 "[T]he merits of the case should not.. .be tried
afresh" in American courts "upon the mere29 assertion...that
the [foreign]
2
fact.,
in
or
law
in
erroneous
was
judgment
In the century or so since Hilton, its comity analysis has become "canonical. 293 As long as foreign courts respect minimal jurisdictional and
due process requirements, American courts "almost always enforce"
their judgments without reexamining the merits.29 4 They do so even
286. Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 296. For another discussion of the ECtHR and national courts, see Ahdieh, supra note 7, at 2154-55.
287. For sources discussing the foreign judgments analogy, see supra note 28.
288. See Silberman, supra note 36, at 352 (discussing the absence of applicable federal law);
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "Enforcement of Judgments,"
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial-691.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (discussing
the absence of an applicable treaty). Negotiations on an international convention, begun in 1992,
have hit an impasse. For a discussion of the obstacles, see Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, The Hague Judgments Convention-And PerhapsBeyond, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A
MULTISTATE WORLD 121, 122-23 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
289. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
290. Id. at 164.
291. Id. at 202-03.
292. Id. at 203. The Hilton Court ultimately decided not to enforce the French judgment in
question because French courts would not reciprocate with regard to American judgments. Id. at
227-28. For more on the reciprocity requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 357-60.
293. Rosen, supra note 31, at 794.
294. Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1869-70 (2005); Rosen, supra
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with respect to claims they would have rejected, as an original matter, as
against public policy. 295 Although American law allows courts to reject
foreign judgments that violate public policy, this is a "very narrow[]"
exception, 296 one that American judges reserve for "rare case[s]," such
as situations "where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just" in the domestic forum.29 7
Some scholars believe that the foreign judgments analysis should be
applied more generally to international judgments. Roger Alford offers
the most thorough treatment of this argument. 298 He maintains that the
rationales that support the comity model in the context of foreign judgments-"predictability, stability, and respect for the rule of law,, 299 as
well as judicial economy 300 apply equally in the context of certain international judgments.3 °1 In the absence of a "binding mandate" in a
treaty or statute, American courts should enforce certain international
judgments on a Hilton theory; 30 2 he gives the ICJ judgment in Avena as
an example. 30 3 Indeed, he predicts, just as "federal courts traditionally
recognize foreign judgments liberally.., one would expect that in most
cases international tribunal decisions would satisfy the Hilton crite15304
ria.
Scholars like Alford, Helfer, Martinez and Slaughter make subtle arguments. They do not maintain that the European and American analogies are exact; indeed, as I show below, the analogies are deeply
flawed.30 5 But, for the moment, the important point is not whether
European regional courts or the American foreign judgments regime
provide precise support for the comity model on a global scale. Rather,
note 31, at 791-92.
295. Rosen, supra note 31, at 793-94.
296. Berman, supra note 294, at 1870; Rosen, supra note 31, at 793.
297. Rosen, supra note 3 1, at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted). American courts do not
enforce foreign judgments that are inconsistent with fundamental constitutional requirements, for
example. For more on this, see infra text accompanying notes 349-51.
298. Alford, supra note 7, at 715-31. Alford offers this treatment in the context of a much
larger work that discusses other possible approaches to international judgments as well. See id. at
683-85 (briefly describing the "full faith and credit," "arbitration," "Charming Betsy," "Paquete
Habana,""special master," and 'no deference"' models).
299. [d. at 719.
300. Id. at 725.
301. Id. at 719-20.
302. See id. at 716, 725, 730.
303. Id. at 729.
304. Id. at 730. For other discussions of the foreign judgments model, see Koh, supra note 23,
at 46-48; Martinez, supra note 2, at 499; Slaughter, supra note 23, at 708.
305. See infra text accompanying notes 330-61.
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it is that the European and American regimes contain strong prodeference presumptions. If the comity model were to work out along
similar lines at the global level, the judicial "dialogue" it entailed would
result, over time, in routine deference by domestic courts to international judgments.
C.

The Comity Model and its Discontents

The dissent in Sanchez-Llamas does not speak in terms of judicial
dialogue or community. It does not refer to presumptions. Nonetheless,
its analysis closely tracks the comity model. The model's influence appears in the dissent's rejection of formal authority for ICJ opinions; its
stress on the desirability of coordinated treaty interpretation; and its
identification of the ICJ as a "natural point of reference" for domestic
courts.3 °6 It also explains the dissent's assertion that the Court should
have adapted its interpretation of the VCCR to conform to the ICJ's
reading, even if that meant qualifying its own earlier opinion in Breard,
and the dissent's dismay at the "unprecedented" nature of the conflict
the Court had created with the ICJ. 30 7 In the past, Justice Breyer suggested, American courts had deferred routinely to the ICJ's views on international law; to back his claim, he cited forty cases in which American courts purportedly had "looked to the ICJ for guidance." 30 8 The
implication was clear: the Sanchez-Llamas Court should not have departed from this pattern of deference without strong reasons for its action.
The Court was right to reject the dissent's analysis. To begin, the dissent greatly exaggerates the extent to which Sanchez-Llamas represents
a departure from past practice. The string cite of decisions in which
American courts "[had] repeatedly looked to the ICJ for guidance" on
international law seems impressive, 30 9 but when one takes the time to
read the cases, one discovers that none of them involves a situation remotely like Sanchez-Llamas. Rather, they refer to ICJ opinions only in
passing for propositions of international law; some of them appear to
view ICJ opinions as having the same authority as law review articles. 310 Several address prosaic questions like internal boundary dis-

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2700 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2684 n.5.
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putes and the definition of inland waters and historic bays. 311 None addresses the question whether American judges must, or even should, defer to the ICJ on sensitive local issues that the judges themselves view
differently. At most, the decisions look to ICJ judgments for information value, and they are entirely consistent with the dualism of SanchezLlamas.
More fundamentally, the comity model does not represent an advance
over the dualist approach. Like the dualist approach, it allows domestic
courts to reap the benefits of international courts. Unlike that approach,
though, it fails to avoid legitimacy concerns.3 12 The model's strong prodeference presumption suggests that, despite the lack of formal obligation, domestic courts would systematically follow international judgments. 313 As a practical matter, international judgments would have
something akin to disposition value for domestic courts. Despite its
supporters' claims, the model would thus do little to address complaints
about unaccountable, alien, and inflexible tribunals issuing rulings that
bind local populations.

Comity supporters might counter that this objection overstates the
uniqueness and rigidity of the presumption. First, a pro-deference presumption is not entirely novel. The Supreme Court has indicated that, in
determining the meaning of a treaty, American courts should look to the
interpretations that other national courts have adopted.31 4 Indeed, the
Court has stated, "'the opinions of.. .sister signatories [are] entitled to
considerable weight."' 3 15 "Considerable weight" sounds like a kind of
presumption-certainly it suggests more deference to foreign views
311. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 (1986) (dispute between Massachusetts
and the United States over title to Nantucket Sound); United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93
(1985) (dispute between states and the United States over title to Mississippi Sound); The Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) (dispute between the United States and Louisiana over
submerged land in the Gulf of Mexico).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16 (explaining how the dualist approach avoids
legitimacy concerns that surround international courts).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 258-305 (exploring the comity model's prodeference presumption).
314. Indeed, in Sanchez-Llamas itself, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the petitioner had
"point[ed] to nothing... in the contemporary practice of other signatories" to counter the Court's
reading of the VCCR. 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006).
315. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978)). For an excellent discussion of the Court's views on
this matter, see Van Alstine, supra note 179, at 1936-42. Van Alstine argues that the prodeference presumption should be particularly powerful with regard to ICJ judgments. Id. at 1938.
Martinez discusses the "sister signatories" doctrine but does not tie it expressly to international
tribunals. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 512-13.
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than mere "respectful consideration"-but one does not hear complaints
about threats to democratic legitimacy. Even Justice Scalia, in other
contexts a quick defender of the priority of American interpretation, 316
has endorsed the Court's approach. In a recent treaty interpretation case,
he chided his colleagues for not taking the views of sister signatories seriously enough.3 17
Second, supporters might contend that opponents ignore the essential
flexibility of the comity model. If the pro-deference presumption proved
too exacting-if it led to something like disposition value for international judgments-domestic courts could weaken it. Or they could refrain from applying the presumption in cases involving sensitive local
issues like criminal punishment. By dampening the force of the presumption, domestic courts could prevent the comity model from becoming a regime of informal but "ritual deference"-an outcome that comity supporters themselves reject.3 8
International courts could themselves play a role in preventing a
comity regime from becoming too centralized. Here again, European arrangements provide comity supporters with examples. In the EU, the
principle of subsidiarity teaches that European institutions should take
action only when domestic authorities cannot do so effectively on their
own-"only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed...action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or the effects.. .be better achieved by the Community." 3 19 In the Council of Europe, the "margin of appreciation" doctrine gives national governments some discretion in determining how
best to meet the requirements of the ECHR. 320 The ECtHR retains a
general supervisory role over the treaty, but domestic authorities, who
are in a better position to understand local conditions, have room to ac-

316. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not have looked to foreign sources in deciding constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for looking to foreign sources in deciding constitutionality of laws criminalizing homosexual conduct).
317. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. Slaughter, supra note 23, at 711 (arguing that comity does not suggest "subordination or
even the more subtle constraints of ritual deference").
319. EC Treaty art. 5; see also George A. Bermann, Taking SubsidiaritySeriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 334 (1994). The
principle applies in areas where the EU does not have "exclusive competence." EC Treaty art. 5.
320. See MERRILLS, supra note 32, at 151; Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights
Jurisdictionin Europe, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 129-30 (2003).
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32
commodate conflicting demands of human rights and public order. '
International courts could apply doctrines like these at the global level
to preserve local autonomy over sensitive issues.3 22
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, with respect to sister signatories, it is a stretch to construe the Court's doctrine as creating a prodeference presumption of the sort the comity model entails. The Court
has never defined, precisely, what it means by "considerable weight. 3 23
While the phrase might suggest a presumption in favor of the views of
foreign courts, it might also connote a less accommodating approach. In
fact, when one examines its decisions, one discovers that the Court does
not act as though a presumption exists. Sometimes it defers to foreign
court views and sometimes it does not; if a presumption exists, the
Court's application of it certainly has been "uneven." 324 One could easily explain the Court's decisions in dualist terms: the Court adopts the
reasoning of foreign courts when it believes there are good reasons for
doing so-promoting uniform treaty interpretation, for example-but
goes its own way when it believes those reasons are lacking. The
Court's views on sister signatory interpretations thus do not really provide support for the comity model.
Second, with regard to flexibility, nothing in the comity literature
suggests that the presumption would be a weak one. As I have explained, both explicitly and implicitly, the model contemplates a strong
pro-deference bias.32 5 Indeed, a weak presumption would drain the
model of practical importance. If the presumption were weak-if domestic courts felt only a slight obligation to defer to international judgments-the model would tend to collapse into dualism, which already
allows domestic courts to look to international judgments for information value and to adopt the reasoning of international courts when they
find it persuasive. 326 If the comity model is to have real world signifi-

321. See Heifer & Slaughter, SupranationalAdjudication, supra note 7, at 316.
322. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 29-30 (arguing that subsidiarity could operate in a decentralized global order); Burke-White, supra note 7, at 86-90 (discussing subsidiarity in the context of international criminal law); Shany, supra note 192, at 908-09 (discussing margin of appreciation doctrine in context of international courts).
323. Van Alstine, supra note 179, at 1936-37.
324. Id. at 1937; see also David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Intepretation,41
UCLA L. REV. 953, 1022 (1994) (discussing cases in which the Rehnquist Court "expressly declined" to adopt foreign views on treaty interpretation).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 258-305.
326. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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cance, it must provide for a more systematic deference to international
courts.

Third, doctrines like subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation seem
too vague to constrain international courts in the long run. Even in the
European context, critics complain about how malleable these doctrines
are. Subsidiarity seems largely a hortatory notion. The doctrine does not

provide a very meaningful check on European legislation; it does not
even apply to ECJ decisions. 32 7 In the ECtHR context, the margin of appreciation doctrine has more bite, but it too is ill defined and unpredict-

able.1 8 The ECtHR has implemented the doctrine in a notoriously uncertain way; as one commentator notes, the Court has not applied it
"identically to every article" of the ECHR, "nor even to different parts
of [the] same article., 329 The doctrine's capacity to provide a principled

check on the Court's decisions seems questionable.
Moreover, doctrines imported from the European experience would
not translate well globally. And here we come to a fundamental problem
with the comity model: its reliance on misplaced analogies. The most
important factors in the success of the ECJ and the ECtHR lack counterparts at the global level. The ECJ has been able to draw on a commitment to political integration. The leaders who established the first

European economic communities in the 1950s saw them as the beginnings of a political union that would make future European wars unthinkable. 330 That vision has motivated generations of European politi327. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 54 (2003) ("The ECJ has not applied the principle to itself
with respect to its own exercises ofjudicial authority."); Mattias Kumm, To Be a European Citizen? The Absence of ConstitutionalPatriotism and the Constitutional Treaty, II COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 481, 501 (2005) (explaining that the ECJ addresses subsidiarity "only in a cavalier fashion");
Franz C. Mayer, Competences-Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the
New European Constitution, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 493, 508 (2005) ("Subsidiarity does not apply
to ECJ decisions."); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1680 (2002)
("European courts generally have.., been reluctant to interpret subsidiarity as a strong limit on
Community power."). A protocol to the recent European Constitutional Treaty arguably strengthens the subsidiarity principle. See Kumm, supra,at 501-02.
328. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Branch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudenceof the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 125
(2004) (doctrine leads to "unpredictable (and often arbitrary) results"); Oren Gross, "Once More
Unto the Breach ": The Systemic Failureof Applying the European Convention on Human Rights
to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 495-96 (1998) (discussing problems
caused by the doctrine's vagueness).
329. MERRILLS, supra note 32, at 151.
330. See JANIS, supra note 60, at 299; Jones, supra note 28, at 221.
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cians and explains the seemingly inexorable trend-inexorable until recently, at least-toward greater power for European institutions, including the ECJ.3 31 It accounts in large part for the Court's success in finding receptive audiences for its assertions of authority. 332 Without it, it
seems doubtful that the ECJ's dialogue with national courts, however
skillful, would have achieved the same result.
The Council of Europe does not aspire to political integration, but it
does rely on the sense of shared identity that makes integration possible.
From its inception, it has committed itself to promoting a common
European identity, first as a means of arresting the spread of totalitarianism, later as a means of ensuring "democratic principles" on the continent. 333 One significant element in that identity is a commitment to a
particular model of human rights. On many issues the ECtHR addresses,
a common outlook exists, at least among political leaders.33 4 Indeed,
even Council members on Europe's periphery, which do not necessarily
share European values, have an interest in going along with the ECtHR.
Compliance with the Court's decisions may be the price of admission to
other projects about which these nations care deeply.33 5
Recent events suggest that the European commitment to integration
has begun to wane; some scholars speak of a "backlash" against both
the ECJ and the ECtHR.336 Even so, the sense of common destiny still
331. See Alter, supra note 268, at 491 (arguing that, in establishing the EU, "[m]ember states
set out to create a supranational political entity"). On the recent retrenchment, see Florian Sander,
SubsidiarityInfringements Before the European Court ofJustice: Futile Interference with Politics
or a Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 517, 519 (2006) (discussing French and Dutch rejection of constitutional treaty).
332. See, e.g., Attanasio, supranote 28, at 380.
Europe,
of
Council
the
About
of
Europe,
Council
333. See
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/aboutCoe/ (last modified May 11, 2007) (explaining that the Council was established, among other reasons, to "promote awareness and encourage the development
of Europe's cultural identity and diversity"); see also JANIS, supra note 60, at 261-62 (discussing
aims of the Council's founders).
334. MERRILLS, supra note 32, at 30-31. As Merrills argues, the court's "relatively homogeneous audience" makes writing persuasive opinions much easier because, "in justifying its conclusions, the court can appeal to a common set of cultural values." Id. at 31. Merrills wrote this in
1993, before the expansion of the Council of Europe, but the proposition still stands, at least for
the Council's core members.
335. See SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 236, at 131 (noting the "implicit linkage between
compliance with the European Convention and attaining or retaining membership in good standing in the European Union").
336. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 268, at 512-13 (describing how "the success of EU legal integration may have instigated a larger backlash" against the ECJ); Alvarez, supra note 7, at 430
(noting that "there is some evidence of backlash" in European politics against both the ECJ and
the ECtHR).
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exists, certainly among political leaders-and nothing like it appears at
the global level. 337 The European experience thus says little about the
prospects for international courts. Consider again, in this regard, subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. Given the shared legal and social culture in Europe, the need for exceptions to centralized rules is
comparatively small.338 In the nature of things, subsidiarity and the
margin of appreciation will come up relatively rarely, and the space they
carve out for local institutions will be relatively narrow. 339 At the global
level, by contrast, much less commonality exists, particularly with regard to the sensitive issues that international courts increasingly address,
and there is no commitment at all to political integration. 340 The doctrines would be much more controversial in that context. The arguments
for exceptions would be more frequent and the claims for local autonomy broader. In the global context, the doctrines would not be as effective in reducing friction as they are in Europe.
The other major analogy, the American foreign judgments regime, is
inapposite as well. Although American courts routinely enforce foreign
judgments, those judgments tend to relate to private commercial disputes. 34 1 In that context, comity arguments work well. 342 Enforcing foreign judgments promotes predictability and finality, two important advantages for international commerce.3 43 It also advances the long term
interests of American business, even when the judgments go against
American defendants. Foreign firms will be more likely to enter into
contracts with American firms if they know that, should disputes arise,
American judges will not insist on retrying
cases that foreign plaintiffs
344
already have litigated, and won, at home.

337. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 7, at 430.
338. See supra text accompanying note 334 (discussing cultural commonality in Europe).
339. See Sander, supra note 331, at 537 (noting that ECJ decisions on subsidiarity are "quite
rare").

340. See Alvarez, supra note 7, at 430.
341. See Dodge, supra note 34, at 161.
342. See Rosen, supra note 31, at 794 (discussing arguments for comity in international
commercial context).
343. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-31
(1985) (discussing international comity in the context of commercial arbitration); see also Koh,
supra note 23, at 48 (discussing how comity promotes predictability and stability in international
transactions).
344. See Rosen, supra note 31, at 804 (describing benefits of enforcement of foreign judgments).
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Moreover, private commercial disputes normally have little impact
on domestic policy choices. 345 In the typical international business litigation, the United States has little interest in whether a particular plaintiff or defendant prevails. Enforcing the judgment merely requires one
private party to pay another; neither outcome will have much impact on
domestic regulatory programs, and commercial law varies relatively little from country to country.34 6 When foreign judgments do affect more
than simply private commercial relations, American courts are much
less receptive. 347 For example, American courts do not enforce foreign
penal or revenue judgments, in large part to avoid potential conflicts
with foreign countries over regulatory policies. 34 8 Moreover, notwithstanding the narrowness of the public policy exception, American courts
do not enforce foreign judgments that trench on fundamental constitutional values. 349 For example, in a much discussed 2001 case, a federal
court held that a French judgment forbidding the sale of Nazi paraphernalia over the internet could not be enforced in the United States, even
under Hilton's comity analysis. 350 Enforcing the French judgment,351the
court reasoned, "would be inconsistent with the First Amendment.
To be sure, the foreign judgments example does suggest that domestic courts would feel comfortable enforcing international judgments in
private commercial matters, and, in fact, domestic courts routinely do
enforce international commercial arbitration awards (though here too
there is a narrow public policy exception).3 52 The example also helps
explain why domestic courts generally enforce investment arbitration
awards. 3 53 International investment panels typically cannot require a
345. See, e.g., Attanasio, supra note 28, at 390-91 (discussing commercial arbitration
awards).
346. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 218 (2005) (discussing the convergence of contract law
principles across countries).
347. See Dodge, supra note 34, at 161.
348. See id. at 165-70 (discussing doctrines against enforcing such judgments); id. at 173
(discussing Learned Hand's explanation of these doctrines).
349. See Rosen, supra note 31, at 785; Van Houweling, supra note 35, at 699-701.
350. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d 1181,
1192-93 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'don other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert.
denied, 126 S.Ct. 2332 (2006).
351. Id. at 1194.
352. See Attanasio, supra note 28, at 378, 390-91; Choi, supra note 183, at 148.
353. For discussions of investment arbitration, see John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the
NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 429 (2006); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121
(2006); Young, supra note 5, at 1170-77. For an application of comity ideas to international in-
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state to change its laws or to refrain "from applying [a] challenged
measure;" 354 they can only order a state to pay money damages to an injured investor, and even in those circumstances the state may be able to
rely on doctrines like sovereign immunity to avoid payment.355 Like
commercial awards, international investment awards typically lack a
significant direct impact on domestic policy choices.
The foreign judgments example does not suggest, however, that domestic courts would systematically defer to international judgments that
do have a significant impact on sensitive local issues. In that context,
the example simply lacks relevance. Moreover, at least traditionally, the
enforcement of foreign judgments has turned on reciprocity. 356 An
American court would enforce a foreign judgment only if the foreign
court would enforce an American judgment, thus creating an incentive
for foreign courts to allow American judgment creditors to execute on
assets in the foreign country. 357 International courts are not in a position
to help American plaintiffs in this way and reciprocity arguments are
thus out of place. While reciprocity does not have the importance in
American practice it once did,358 it remains an important requirement
for the enforcement of foreign judgments in other countries, 359 and its
total absence in the context of international courts provides another reason why the Hilton analogy is misplaced.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the enforcement of foreign
judgments differs categorically from the comity model in terms of the
intrusion it contemplates on domestic courts. As I have explained, enforcing a foreign judgment has only a small, discrete impact on a legal
system; 36° the foreign judgment affects only the parties to a particular
case. The comity model, by contrast, envisions a more general reorganization of domestic law: the reasoning of international judgments would

vestment awards, specifically in the context of NAFTA chapter t1,see Ahdieh, supra note 7.
354. Knox, supra note 353, at 429.
355. Id.; see M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 304-

05 (2000) (discussing availability of the sovereign immunity defense under ICSID Convention).
356. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 512. The reciprocity requirement appears in Hilton itself.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
357. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1661 (1968).
358. See Silberman, supra note 36, at 353.
359. See Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments, 56 RECORD 378, 400
(2001), availableat http://www.abcny.org/Publications/record/summer01 .pdf.
360. See supra text accompanying note 346.
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bind domestic courts in future cases involving different parties. 36 1 As a
result, the foreign judgments analogy has little bearing on the problems
that the comity model would raise.
The failings of the comity model feature prominently in SanchezLlamas. Consider the "dialogue" between the ICJ and Justice Breyer.
The ICJ judgments addressed criminal punishment for serious offenses,
and, at least indirectly, the death penalty. 362 These were surely matters
at the core of domestic responsibility. Yet the ICJ did not temper its rulings out of a concern for subsidiarity or the margin of appreciation. It
insisted that procedural default rules could not bar judicial reconsideration of foreign nationals' convictions, notwithstanding the role that such
rules traditionally play in the American justice system, and notwithstanding the fact that the United States already had taken considerable
steps to improve local compliance with VCCR requirements. 363 For his
part, Justice Breyer did not think the sensitive nature of the issues involved required him to weaken the pro-deference presumption. Indeed,
he castigated the Court for creating an "unprecedented" conflict with the
ICJ, suggesting, with his long string cite, that Avena and LaGrand deserved no less deference than earlier ICJ opinions on the boundaries of
historic bays.36 4 As one would have predicted, in practice the "cooperation" between international and domestic judiciaries turned out to be
something closer to the sort of "ritual deference" that the comity model
theoretically rejects.36 5
Moreover, even on a comity theory, deferring to the ICJ would have
raised serious legitimacy concerns. Unlike in Europe, no shared commitment to political integration could have encouraged compliance with
the ICJ's views. 366 Nor could the ICJ have relied on a sense of common
culture to smooth its way with American audiences.36 7 Finally, unlike
the low profile commercial disputes that provide the context for cases
like Hilton, Sanchez-Llamas involved a salient issue that already had
361. Cf Bradley, supra note 20, at 94 (distinguishing between enforcing a judgment and
adopting a court's reasoning).
362. See McGuinness, supra note 8, at 757.
363. See supra text accompanying note 219.
364. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2701-02 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
For more on this point, see supra text accompanying notes 309-11.
365. See Slaughter, supra note 23, at 711 (arguing that comity does not suggest "subordination or even the more subtle constraints of ritual deference").
366. See supra text accompanying notes 330-3 1(discussing drive for political integration in
Europe).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
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caused the United States to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Deferring to the ICJ would not have required one private party to pay
money to another; it would have involved the retrial of a criminal defendant convicted of a serious offense. For Justice Breyer to argue that
"respectful consideration" nonetheless required American courts to defer to the ICJ shows how incongruous the model is in this context.
Of course, comity advocates might hope that the model would itself
ameliorate some of these concerns over time. If domestic judges routinely deferred to them, judgments like LaGrandand Avena would seem
less remote and alien. Judicial dialogue could lead, gradually, to a consensus on legal norms, even in areas as sensitive as criminal law and
human rights.3 68 This argument seems backwards, though. When it
comes to judicial authority, legitimacy yields deference, not the other
way around.36 9 People do not find court decisions acceptable because
they acquiesce in them; people acquiesce in court decisions because
they find them, for one reason or another, acceptable. Outside the commercial context, the global consensus necessary to support the comity
model does not yet exist. It seems doubtful that the model itself could
create it. It seems more probable that the model would cause friction
that would make a gradual convergence of norms even less likely.
III.

CONCLUSION

For comity supporters, Sanchez-Llamas is an occasion for regret. The
Court rejected the model that they have been assiduously constructing
for the past decade. Yet, as I have tried to show here, the Court was

right to do so. The dualist approach offers a better way of integrating international and domestic courts. It allows domestic judges to balance the

competing demands of global order and local autonomy while avoiding
serious legitimacy concerns. In adopting the dualist approach, the Sanchez-Llamas Court not only cast doubt on the long term prospects of
comity scholarship. It also assured that the American approach to international judgments will be a sensible one.

368. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 7, at 78-79 (discussing how judicial dialogue can lead to
global consensus on various legal issues, especially "basic human rights"); Slaughter, supra note
27, at 64 (arguing that "increased transjudicial communication" could lead to wider and "enhanced protection of universal human rights").
369. See KRAMER, supra note 202, at 231.

